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Executive summary 
We know from previous research that the earnings of companies are managed to a lesser or greater 
extent. The motivations for this managing of earnings have been under scrutiny and have led to the 
introduction of various guidelines, obligatory or voluntary, which should prevent earnings management 
from taking place.  
The definitions of earnings management are numerous, that is from income smoothing to the purposeful 
intervention in the managing reported earnings. In this thesis we use the definition of Healy: “earnings 
management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions 
in financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of 
the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers”.1 The 
two aspects of Healy‟s definition that are important are the fact that the stakeholder is misled about the 
outcome of the company‟s economic performance and the fact that it influences certain contracts that 
underlie the reported outcome. The motivations for earnings management can be put into the following 
categories: 1) motivations to smooth earnings, 2) motivations to meet the expectations of the analysts or 
of the company‟s stakeholders, 3) motivations from contractual perspectives such as to maximize the 
bonus of the manager, and 4) motivations to reduce tax expenses. We highlight them and discuss the 
models to detect earnings management. For our research we use the Modified Jones Model as from 
scientific research it turned to be the most powerful one to detect earnings management. 
The Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes contains companies which have to meet a number of criteria 
before they are admitted to the Index. A sustainable company has an approach towards doing business 
„that creates long-term shareholder value by embracing opportunities and managing risks deriving from 
economic, environmental and social developments‟ 2. Two aspects are important in this description: 
long-term which is embedded in the word sustainable, and the fact that opportunities are embraced and 
risks are managed.  We then highlight the relationship between a sustainable company and its financial 
performance. Most studies indicate that the relationship is positive, although further research on this 
topic should be done and is to include industry-specific characteristics. We discuss the relationship 
between a sustainable company and the way it reports its earnings. Although both listed non-
sustainable and sustainable companies have to meet the requirements of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) for reporting their earnings, there is not an obligatory standard format for 
reporting a company‟s social, economic and environmental achievements, and auditing of those reports 
is recommended in order to do benchmarking. More research has to be done on how to report CSR or 
sustainability and how this is translated into financial data. We assume that sustainable companies do 
not manage their reported earnings, as the impact of detection is greater than for non-sustainable 
companies. 
Our strategy of research is as follows. We first formulate two hypotheses. The null hypothesis implies 
that both our sample of sustainable and non-sustainable companies manage their earnings to the same 
extent, whereas the alternative hypothesis assumes that there is earnings management in both 
sustainable and non-sustainable companies but there is a difference in the extent to which earnings are 
managed. We then discuss the Modified Jones Model to be used for detecting earnings management. 
Finally, we delineate our samples of sustainable and non-sustainable companies. The sample of 
sustainable companies consists of the companies in the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSI). As 
                                               
1 Healey, et al., (1999), p. 368. 
2 www.sustainability-index.com 
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the DJSI only includes the biggest companies, we choose non-sustainable companies of the S&P 
Global BMI on the basis of their market value.  
When we start gathering our data, our sample of DJSI sustainable companies dwindles down from over 
300 to 65 companies. The queries we run in the CompuStat Global database turn up with missing data 
for a number of companies, or different book years for other companies. We leave out those companies, 
which means a limitation for our research. We can only use the quarterly data of the years 2006 up to 
and including 2008, because the guideline ISAE3000 was introduced in 2005 and became mandatory. 
The ISAE3000 provides a framework in which accounting professionals can deliver sustainability 
assurance on (selected) information (or assertions) reported by the client and, in so doing, applies the 
principles of materiality, completeness and responsiveness to the pre-determined “subject matter” 
(scope).3 Our research thus covers 1560 observations.  
We discuss the limitations of our research: 1) we can use only 3 quarters prior to the years 2006-2008 
instead of 12 quarters, 2) we have to limit ourselves to the years 2006-2008 due to the financial crisis 
and the introduction of ISAE3000 in 2005, and 3) our sample consists of only 65 companies. The 
processing of the data and the analysis of the tests are carefully executed in order to ensure the criteria 
of validity. 
Before we process our data of both samples in the software programme SPSS, we verify the data. We 
start with executing tests of normality to check whether the data as such meet the assumptions 
underlying statistics of the Modified Jones Model. As all above-mentioned tests fail, we cannot apply the 
Modified Jones Model. The tests of Normality suggest a serious violation of the assumption of normality. 
This is also confirmed by the Normal Q-Q Plots which do not show a straight line, the Detrended Q-Q 
Plots which show a random picture of the plots, by the strong negative and positive figures for 
skewness, and by a very peaked kurtosis. Subsequent analyzing of the scatter plots reveals that there 
is hardly any noticeable linearity. This implies that our research does not meet the assumptions of the 
statistics we want to use, that is to say the multiple regression as given in the Modified Jones Model. 
As „only linear relationships are suitable for correlation analyses (Pallant, p. 72), we transform the 
dependent variable mathematically using the formulas square root, logarithm, and inverse. 
Unfortunately, the results of these „transformations‟ give about 50% missing data. As none of the 
statistical tests discussed above meets the assumptions underlying statistics, we resort to non-
parametric techniques to further analyse our data. We execute non-parametric tests, the Mann-Whitney 
U Test and the Kruskal-Wallis Test, in order to find the cause of the non-linearity of the data. In neither 
of the quarters 4 is the probability value (p) less than or equal to .05 which indicates that statistically 
there is not a significant difference in the amounts of total accruals of sustainable and non-sustainable 
companies (Pallant, p. 222). 
As our data do not to meet the assumptions underlying the statistics of multiple regression of the 
Modified Jones Model, our research comes to a standstill. We are unable to test what we want to test, 
that is whether there is a difference in the extent to which sustainable and non-sustainable companies 
manage their earnings. 
 
 
                                               
3 Iansen-Rogers, J., Oelschlaegel, J., (2005), Assurance Standards Briefing, AA1000Assurance Standard ξ ISAE3000, 
AccountAbility and KPMG, p. 20. 
4 Appendix D gives the results of all quarters on the Mann-Whitney U test. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Newspaper articles, mainly in “Het Financieele Dagblad”, 5 about sustainability and corporate 
governance, inspired me to write this thesis about earnings management and sustainable companies. 
The concept of sustainability is fascinating, in particular as it may bring along innovation for future 
generations. Resources are limited whilst there is an increase in population. So, new applications have 
to be invented to make the resources stretch and/or find other solutions. 
Sustainable enterprising 6 started in the early nineties and has boomed since 2000.7 Pressure on 
companies to manage their companies in a sustainable way is increasing. In the last few decades, not 
only do the European Community and the Club of Rome put more emphasis on sustainable 
enterprising, but also the Dutch government 8 has directed more attention to encourage sustainable 
enterprising. These developments, globally and nationally, have led to treatises (for instance, the Kyoto 
Protocol‟s project mechanisms, Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanisms), guidelines, 
and instruments.  
In the Netherlands the coalition of Dutch Civil Society Organisations and Trade Unions have developed 
the Corporate Social Responsibility Frame of Reference. “The CSR Frame of Reference lists the 
relevant standards, agreements and operational aspects involved in CSR internationally. This is done 
on the basis of treaties, guidelines and instruments enjoying broad international support and leading 
either directly or indirectly, to corporate accountability and responsibilities”.9  
In this thesis the concept of earnings management is defined, the motivations for earnings 
management, and the models to detect earnings management are discussed. Reported earnings can 
be managed to a lesser or greater extent, that is from no or slight earnings management to an instance 
of earnings management that is beyond legal boundaries and is considered fraud. The extent to which 
reported earnings are managed is highlighted by the different definitions of earnings management. 
It is clear from scientific research that many companies manage their earnings.10 In research by, among 
others, Hepworth (1953), Gordon (1964), Beidleman (1973), and Subramanyam (1996) earnings 
management is defined as smoothing of income. For instance, Beidleman (1973) defines smoothing of 
reported earnings “as the intentional dampening of fluctuations about some level of earnings that is 
currently considered normal for a firm. 11  
This definition is simple. Over the years the implications of smoothing of reported earnings have begun 
to become more serious, mainly due to scandals such as Enron and Ahold. For instance, Schippers 12 
defines earnings management as “disclosure management in the sense of a purposeful intervention in 
the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain, as opposed to 
                                               
5 See section 7.1 Newspaper articles, p. 54. 
6 In Dutch Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen 
7 Het Financieele Dagblad, Voorbij schuld en reputatie, 29-04-2006. 
8 The Dutch Social and Economic Council (SER) issued a document entitled “Corporate Social Responsibility  - A Dutch 
Approach”, in which she states that “CSR should be a core concern for all companies and should be part and parcel of its 
operations”.  
9 Coalition of Dutch CSOs & Trade Unions, “CSR Frame of Reference”, July 2003, p.2. 
10 Healey, P. M. & J.M. Wahlen, „A review of the Earnings Management Literature and its Implication for Standard Setting‟, 
in: Accounting Horizons, December 1999, pp. 365-383. 
11 Beidleman, C. R., „Income Smoothing: The Role of Management‟, in: The Accounting Review, October 1973, Vol. XLVIII, 
no. 4, p. 653. 
12 Schipper, K. (1989), „Commentary on earnings management‟, in: Accounting Horizons, 3 (4), pp. 91-102. 
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merely facilitating the neutral operation of the process. As in this thesis reported earnings are not 
managed by sustainable companies for “some private gain”, this definition is not used in this  research 
on earnings management in sustainable companies. Healy et al. (1999) state that “earnings 
management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions 
in financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of 
the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers”.13 Two 
aspects of Healy‟s definition are important: 1) mislead the stakeholder about the outcome of the 
company‟s economic performance, and 2) management of reported earnings influences certain 
contracts that underlie the reported outcome. A sustainable company takes care of all its stakeholders. 
This means that when earnings management influences a contract for instance with its employees, it is 
in conflict with the way a sustainable company does business. Therefore, the definition of Healy et al. is 
used in this thesis. 
As stated above, it is clear that earnings management takes place. But what are the motivations to 
manage reported earnings? These motivations can be put into categories: 1) motivations to smooth 
earnings (Hepworth, 1953; Gordon, 1964; Beidleman, 1973; Subramanyam, 2006), 2) motivations to 
meet the expectations of the analysts or of the company‟s stakeholders (Bowen et al., 1995; Degeorge 
et al., 1999; Healy, 1999; Roychowdhury, 2006; Athanasokou, 2009), 3) motivations from contractual 
perspectives such as to maximize the bonus of the manager (Healy, 1985), and 4) motivations to 
reduce tax expenses (Jones, 1991). For instance, in her research on the motivation of companies to 
reduce tax expenses, Jones (1991) concentrates on the provision of deferred tax in the balance sheet 
over several periods. 
Thus, if the researcher is aware of the motivation of earnings management, he can detect earnings 
management more easily. To give another example, earnings management can be due to the choice of 
accounting methods (Langendijk, 2005; Mertens, 1997). By analyzing the effects of the choice of 
accounting rules earnings management can be detected, as the chosen accounting method may 
influence the value of intangible assets and thus decrease or increase the amount of earnings. 
However, if the choice of accounting method is not the cause of earnings management, it is often hard 
to prove that reported earnings have been managed. It is difficult to put earnings management into 
accounting numbers as it centers “on managerial intent, which is unobservable” 14. The definition of 
earnings management impacts the model that is used for testing whether companies manage their 
reported earnings or not (Dechow et al., 1995; Ohlson, 1995; Dechow et al., 2002). There are numerous 
models with which earnings management can be detected.  
Models with which earnings management can be detected are discussed, among others, by Beidleman 
(1973), and Bissessur et al. (2005) 15. Beidleman (1973) demonstrates two models, the linear and the 
semi-logarithmic model in order to prove that smoothing of reported earnings is common. Other models 
to detect earnings management are the total accrual-based model, the specific accrual model, and the 
behaviour around a certain point (Bissessur et al., 2005). Bissessur et al. (2005) suggest that the best 
way to detect earnings management is with the help of a mixture of the three above-mentioned models. 
However, this model has not been developed yet, so we have to choose one of the existing models to 
detect earnings management.  
                                               
13 Healey, et al., (1999), p. 368. 
14 Dechow, P.M. and Skinner, D.J., (2000), „Earnings Management: Reconciling the views of accounting academics, 
practitioners, and regulators‟, in: Accounting Horizons, June, Vol. 12 No.2, p. 238. 
15 Bissessur S., Langendijk H.P.A.J., (2005), „Earnings management: de stand van zaken ten aanzien van het 
onderzoeksontwerp‟, in: Financial Accounting, nummer 5 mei. 
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The most common accrual-based models to detect earnings management are: 1) Healy Model, 2) 
DeAngelo Model, 3) Jones Model, 4) Modified Jones Model, en 5) Industry Model. Dechow et al. (1995) 
16 evaluate these models and conclude that the Modified Jones Model has the most power to detect 
earnings management. Thus, the Modified Jones Model is used in this thesis in order to detect the 
extent to which sustainable companies differ from non-sustainable companies manage the earnings 
they report by means of discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. The advantages and 
disadvantages of the above-mentioned accrual-based models are discussed in detail. 
Although scientific research on earnings management is quite extensive, it is hard to find research 
specifically on earnings management by sustainable companies. The concept of sustainable companies 
is very interesting, as scandals such as the bankruptcy of Enron and WorldCom have led to an 
awareness that companies have a responsibility that goes beyond the one to their shareholders. But, 
what does this responsibility imply? 
Before this question can be answered, the relationship between a company‟s corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and its financial performance is highlighted. This relationship has been examined 
by, among others, Pava and Krausz, 1996; Waddock and Graves. 1997; Verschoor, 1998; Roberts and 
Dowling, 2002; Nelling and Webb, 2009. Their findings are not conclusive. Some researchers prove that 
the relationship between CSR and financial performance is positive, whereas other researchers indicate 
that the relationship is neutral (McWilliams et al., 2001) or even negative. Besides, most studies point 
out that further research should be done and include industry-specific characteristics (Bowen et al., 
1985), unobservable firm characteristics (Nelling et al., 2009), intangible assets (Hirst et al., 2003), or 
asset age (Cochran et al., 1984).  
Listed, both sustainable and non-sustainable, companies have to report their earnings according the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Beside a financial report, many companies publish 
a social or sustainability report in which they single out their social, and environmental achievements. 
But, does more information mean more transparency? According to Arya et al. (2003), there is a 
problem with transparency in that „it can encourage a manager to spend his time signaling his ability 
(posturing), instead of tending to business‟, and more transparency in financial reporting does not 
necessarily lead to better corporate governance 17.  
Research by Gelb et al. demonstrates that „enhanced disclosures increase demand for a firm‟s 
securities and ultimately lower its cost of capital‟. 18 Hunton et al. (2006) show that „greater transparency 
in comprehensive income reporting reduces the likelihood that managers will engage in earnings 
management‟ 19. We, therefore, assume that there is no or less earnings management by sustainable 
companies.  
In view of these developments we are interested in earnings management by sustainable companies. 
The research question of this thesis is: Do sustainable and non-sustainable companies differ in their 
extent to which they manage their earnings? 
                                               
16 Dechow, P. M., R.G. Sloan & A.P. Sweeney, 1995, „Detecting Earnings Management‟, in: The Accounting Review, April, 
Vol. 70 No. 2, pp. 193-225. 
17 Arya, A., Glover, J.C., Sunder, S., (2003), „Are unmanaged earnings always better for shareholders?, in: Accounting 
Horizons, Supplement, p. 114. 
18 Gelb, D.S., Strawser, J.A., 2001, „Corporate social responsibility and financial disclosure: an alternative explanation for 
increased disclosure, in: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 1-13.  
19 Hunton, James, E. Libby, Robert  
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To answer this question, the following sub-questions need to be answered first: 1) what is earnings 
management?, 2) what are the motivations for earnings management?, 3) which model can be used to 
detect earnings management?, 4) what is a sustainable company?, 5) which criteria are used to 
determine whether a company is a sustainable company?, 6) what is the relationship between a 
sustainable company and its financial performance?, 7) what are the results of previous research with 
respect to this relationship?, 8) what are the results of research in this thesis with respect to the 
relationship between a sustainable company and its financial performance?, 9) which accruals are used 
by non-sustainable companies to portray their results more favourable than they really are?, 10) in what 
way do these accruals differ from those used by sustainable companies to manage their earnings? 
This thesis is composed as follows. In chapter 2 the concept of earnings management is defined, the 
motivations for earnings management are gone into, and finally the various models to detect earnings 
management are discussed.  
In chapter 3 the concept of a sustainable company is clarified. Second, the relationship between a 
sustainable company and its financial performance is investigated. Third, the relationship between 
reporting and a sustainable company is discussed. Finally, the relationship between a sustainable 
company and earnings management is investigated. 
Focus on the actual research is done in chapter 4. Two hypotheses are formulated and the sample of 
both sustainable and non-sustainable companies is delineated. The gathering of data is discussed in 
detail, that is to say which database is used, which data are to be gathered. We explain the Modified 
Jones Model, and which data are needed for its formula.  
In chapter 5 the data gathered are being analyzed.  Queries for normality are run in the software 
programme SPSS. The limitations of our research are discussed. In the last chapter the findings of this 
research are summarized and the conclusions highlighted. 
This thesis wants to contribute to the knowledge of the concept of earnings management by companies 
in general and of earnings management by sustainable companies in particular. 
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2. Earnings management 
We introduced our subject and set out the division of the thesis. This chapter is divided into three 
sections. First, we define the concept of earnings management used in this thesis, as there are 
numerous definitions of earnings management. This gives an answer to the first sub-question: what is 
earnings management? We discuss briefly the ways in which earnings can be managed and how 
earnings management can be prevented before answering the second sub-question, what are the 
motivations for earnings management? Those motivations may be different for sustainable companies, 
although detection of earnings management may have a greater impact on sustainable companies. 
Finally, highlighting the models to detect earnings management gives an answer to the third sub-
question.  
Annual reporting policy is the use of a set of accounting rules by a company in order to report its 
earnings yearly. The ways in which a company applies the chosen accounting rules refers to the actual 
intervention in the reporting process (Langendijk, 1998, p. 9), which is called managing the reporting of 
a company‟s earnings. It is clear from scientific research that many companies manage their earnings20. 
 
2.1 The concept of earnings management 
This research wants to investigate whether there is a difference in the extent of earnings management 
between sustainable and non-sustainable companies. As the concept of earnings management is 
defined by scientific researchers differently, it is important to define earnings management as it is used 
in this thesis. Besides, we assume that detection of earnings management is more harmful to a 
sustainable company than it is to a non-sustainable company. This implies that the definition of earnings 
management is to incorporate aspects which are important to a sustainable company. The definition of 
earnings management discloses in a sense when managing reported earnings is considered mere 
window dressing or when it is looked upon as fraud. Examples of the latter are, for instance, earnings 
management by Enron and WorldCom. The way these companies managed their earnings was 
considered fraud (Wikipedia). The extent to which reported earnings are managed is highlighted by the 
various definitions of earnings management.  
Earnings management is defined as smoothing of income, among others, by Hepworth (1953), Gordon 
(1964), Beidleman (1973), and Subramanyam (1996). Hepworth explains that smoothing of reported 
earnings is considered “an efficient way to reflect a good picture about the firm‟s future income flows to 
investors” 21. Gordon comes to the conclusion that „management does smooth income and the rate of 
growth in income”. 22 Beidleman (1973) defines income smoothing “as the intentional dampening of 
fluctuations about some level of earnings that is currently considered normal for a firm. In this sense 
smoothing represents an attempt on the part of the firm‟s management to reduce abnormal variations in 
earnings to the extent allowed under sound accounting and management principles”.23 Beidleman 
justifies the smoothing of reported earnings by managers. Subramanyam (1996) finds evidence of 
                                               
20 Beidleman, 1973; Schipper, 1989; Healy et al., 1999; ter Hoeven, 2000; Roychowdhury, 2006. 
21 Aljifri, K., (2007), „Measurement and motivations of earnings management: A critical perspective‟, in: Journal of Accounting 
– Business & Management, Vol. 14, pp. 75-95. 
22 Gordon, M.J., (1964), „Postulates, principles and research in accounting‟, in: The Accounting Review, Vol. 65, pp. 262. 
23 Beidleman, C. R., (1973), „Income Smoothing: The Role of Management‟, in: The Accounting Review, October, Vol. XLVIII, 
no. 4, p. 653. 
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income smoothing “which improves the persistence and predictability of earnings”, that is, “the 
smoothing appears to improve rather than diminish the value relevance of reported earnings” 24. 
On the other hand, there are studies in which focus is on the impact of the smoothing of earnings. Lev 
(1989) argues that the smoothing of income decreases the value of earnings quality. Vander Bauwhede 
(2003) finds that Belgian firms manage their reported earnings to meet the expectations of the investors, 
but that these firms will have to answer for their behaviour one day. Tucker et al. (2006) investigate 
whether income smoothing improves earnings informativeness or makes earnings noisier. They 
conclude that if managers use discretion while reporting the company‟s earnings, they reveal more 
information about the company‟s future earnings and cash flows. 25 
Thus, on the one hand, the smoothing of income is considered to serve the interests of the investor 
and/or shareholder, and to reveal more information about a company. On the other hand, smoothing of 
reported income is considered harmful for the investor and/or shareholder, and to make earnings noisier 
(Tucker et al., 2006)  
Another type of earnings management is the annual report policy as defined by Langendijk (1998), 
Hoogendoorn (2000), and ter Hoeven (2000). They discuss the financial accounting regulations as the 
cause of earnings management. Langendijk (1998) clearly distinguishes between earnings 
management and earnings manipulation.26 The former implies window dressing within the boundaries 
set by Dutch Civil Code Title 9 and the Guidelines of the Assurance Standards Committee, whereas the 
latter refers to the sort of window dressing that is unacceptable, that is to say, illegitimate. Hoogendoorn 
(2000) 27, on the other hand, explains that the bottom line 28 is essential for a number of stakeholders, 
as for instance, the shareholders, the providers of loans, the consumers, the employees, the company‟s 
competitors, the government, the treasury and the company‟s management. He clarifies the various 
methods to manage reported earnings, that is, the choice of accounting format, the accounting format 
alterations, the choice of estimation method of, for instance, assets, and actual transactions. In the 
opinion of Ter Hoeven (2000) 29 annual report policy and earnings management are very similar. He 
explains that profit smoothing (“winstegalisatie”) is in everybody‟s interest and is considered acceptable 
annual report policy. He further goes into detail about the word “intentional” (in Beidleman‟s definition, 
1973) which has been replaced by the word “deliberate” (in the definition of Barnea et al., 1976). 
The connotation of the word “deliberate” is also found in the definition of earnings management by 
Schipper (1989), and Healy et al. (1999). Schipper uses the word „purposeful‟, whereas in the definition 
of Healy et al. we find the word „mislead‟. Schipper defines earnings management as “disclosure 
management in the sense of a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with 
the intent of obtaining some private gain, as opposed to merely facilitating the neutral operation of the 
process” 30. This definition is rather restricted, as it focuses on the fact that managers have “private 
gain” in mind when they manage the reporting of their companies‟ earnings. As private gain is not the 
                                               
24 Subramanyam, K.R.,  (1996), „The pricing of discretionary accruals‟, in: Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 22, p. 
278. 
25 Tucker, J.W., Zarowin, P.A., (2006), „Does income smoothing improve earnings informativeness?‟, in: The accounting 
review, Vol. 81, No. 1, p. 268. 
26 Langendijk, H.P.A.J., (1998), De kwaliteit van de winststuring, Een essay over winstbepaling, winststuring alsmede 
winstbestemming, Nyenrode University Press, Breukelen, oratie. 
27 Hoogendoorn, M.N., (2000), „Sturing van de winstcijfers: waarom en hoe?‟, in: FSR Forum, nr.2 feb., pp. 18-22. 
28 Bottom line is in this context the profit of a company. 
29 Hoeven, Dr. R.I. ter, (2000), „Onderzoek naar Jaarrekeningenbeleid en winstegalisatie; a continuing story‟, in: FSR Forum, 
nr 2 feb., pp. 23-28. 
30 Schipper, K., (1989), „Commentary on earnings management‟, in: Accounting Horizons, Vol.3, Issue 4, pp. 92. 
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only motivation for earnings management, Schipper‟s definition is not used in this thesis. Healy et al. 
(1999) state that “earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and 
in structuring transactions in financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers”.31 The definition of Healy et al. is more comprehensive than Schipper‟s definition, 
as it includes more situations, that is to say, misleading stakeholders, and influencing contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.  
Healy et al. (1999) further state that research on earnings management does not influence people who 
set standards or regulations for reporting a company‟s earnings (for instance, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in the United States). They come to the conclusion that more research is 
needed, but that this has to focus on “documenting the extent and magnitude of earnings management 
for specific accruals, from reconciling conflicting findings on the effect of earnings management on stock 
prices and resource allocation in the economy, and from identifying factors that limit earnings 
management”.32  
The line between income smoothing, earnings management and fraud is hard to draw with precision. 
Some earnings management is within the accounting rules set for reporting a company‟s earnings, but 
is still considered fraudulent when managerial intent becomes obvious. This idea is consistent with the 
definition of Healy et al. (1999). The two aspects of Healy‟s definition that are important are the fact that 
the stakeholder is misled about the outcome of the company‟s economic performance and the fact that 
it influences certain contracts that underlie the reported outcome. The definition of Healy et al. is 
therefore used in this thesis.  
Due to the scandals involving Enron (2001) and World.com (2002), the cry for more transparent 
reporting formats has become louder. One way to prevent earnings management is by introducing a 
reporting format which is more transparent, that is to say there is no misunderstanding about the 
accounting rules companies have to apply when reporting their earnings. Standard setters and 
regulators, such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board or the International Accounting 
Standards Board, issued statements which lead to a clearer reporting of, for instance, other 
comprehensive items (SFAS No. 130, amended 2007).33  
In his speech on September 28, 1998, Chairman Arthur Levitt of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) expressed his concern about selective disclosure.34 According to him, five of the 
more popular types of earnings management are “big bath” restructuring charges, creative acquisition 
accounting, “cookie jar reserves”, “immaterial” misapplications of accounting principles, and the 
premature recognition of revenue.35 He argues that earnings management is not new, but it has become 
a vicious circle. Companies try to live up to the expectations of analysts, analysts fall back on 
companies for support of their analyses and auditors are under pressure to confirm the reported 
earnings. “The flexibility in accounting allows it to keep pace with business innovations”, but “abuses, 
                                               
31 Healey, et al., (1999), p. 368. 
32 Healey, et al., (1999), p. 380. 
33 Hunton, James E., Libby, Robert, Mazza, (2006), Cheri L., „Financial Reporting Transparency and Earnings Management‟, 
in: The Accounting Review, Vol. 81, No. 1, pp. 135-157. 
34 Levitt, Arthur, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, (1998), The “Numbers Game”, Remarks at the New 
York University Center for Law and Business, 28 September 1998. 
35 Levitt, Arthur, (1998). 
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such as earnings management 36 (according to Levitt this is earnings manipulation) occur when people 
exploit this pliancy.” 37 He appealed to corporate management and Wall Street to restore the values that 
have up till then represented the capital markets. 
Levitt‟s appeal has not brought about the change he asked for. Since his speech in 1998, a number of 
scandals took place, such as Enron in 2001, WorldCom in 2002 and Ahold in 2003. Due to these 
scandals, the accounting reporting rules have become stricter (SFAS No. 130, amended 2007, US 
GAAP en IFRS). But, do these stricter rules prevent earnings management from taking place? 
Although companies, and in particular listed companies, are not free to choose the format in which they 
report their earnings, it appears from research that there is still some flexibility in applying the rules of 
reporting the company‟s financial performance. Vander Bauwhede (2003) concludes that „with earnings 
management within GAAP the earnings are influenced by the flexibility inherent in accounting reporting 
rules‟ (“bij resultaatsturing binnen GAAP wordt het resultaat beïnvloed door het aanwenden van de 
aanwezige flexibiliteit in de verslagleggingsregels” 38). In his discussion of the „pros and cons for 
investors‟, Ball (2006) concludes that fair value accounting with IFRS will always be ambiguous, that is 
to say that “timely loss recognition is a long-standing property of financial reporting”, but that “timely gain 
recognition is not as prevalent in practice” 39. So, in spite of the fact that reporting rules have become 
stricter over the years, these strict rules cannot prevent earnings management from taking place. 
However, the reporting format should be flexible to allow for business innovations, as Levitt claims 40. 
The flexibility of the rules will be further discussed in the section on motivations for earnings 
management. According to Dechow et al. (2000)41, some earnings management is expected and should 
exist in capital markets. Besides, they point out that accounting academics have different perceptions of 
earnings management than practitioners and regulators have. They come to the conclusion that the 
accounting academics understate the problem and the regulators and practitioners overstate the extent 
of the problem of earnings management. 42 
The various types of earnings management have been discussed. In this thesis we use Healy‟s 
definition of earnings management, as it highlights two aspects which we think are essential in a study 
on earnings management with sustainable companies. These are 1) misleading the stakeholder about 
the outcome of the company‟s economic performance, and 2) influencing certain contracts that underlie 
the reported outcome. These aspects are further discussed in chapter 3 when defining a sustainable 
company. We further discussed how reported earnings can be managed and how earnings 
management can be prevented. We assume that there is less earnings management with sustainable 
companies as these companies publish more information about the ins and outs of their companies. 
However, we have to bear in mind that more information does not necessarily lead to more 
transparency and to better corporate governance.  
                                               
36 According to Levitt (1998), “we are witnessing an erosion in the quality of earnings, and therefore the quality of financial 
reporting. Managing may be giving way to manipulation; Integrity may be losing out to illusion.” 
37 Levitt, Arthur, (1998). 
38 Bauwhede, H. Vander, (2003), „Resultaatsturing en Kapitaalmarkten, Een Overzicht van de Academische Literatuur‟, in: 
Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie, mei, pp. 196-204. 
39 Ball, Ray, (2006), „International Financial Reportings Standards (IFRS): pros and cons for investors‟, in: Accounting and 
Business Research, International Accounting Policy Forum, p. 14. 
40 Levitt, Arthur, (1998). 
41 Dechow, et al., (2000). 
42 Dechow, et al., (2000), p. 247. 
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The extent to which reported earnings can be managed depends to a great extent on the motivations of 
those who manage the reported earnings. The motivations of those who manage the reported earnings 
are discussed in the next subsection.  
 
2.2 Motivations for earnings management 
We defined the concept of earnings management in the previous subsection. However, what are the 
motivations for earnings management? This is important for our thesis as the motivations for earnings 
management with non-sustainable companies may differ from those with sustainable companies. The 
motivations for earnings management can be put into the following categories: 1) motivations to smooth 
earnings (Hepworth, 1953; Gordon, 1964; Beidleman, 1973; Subramanyam, 2006), 2) motivations to 
meet the expectations of the analysts or of the company‟s stakeholders (Bowen et al., 1995; Degeorge 
et al., 1999; Healy, 1999; Roychowdhury, 2006; Athanasokou, 2009), 3) motivations from contractual 
perspectives such as to maximize the bonus of the manager (Healy, 1985), and 4) motivations to 
reduce tax expenses (Jones, 1991). We discuss these motivations in the above-mentioned sequence.  
The first motivation for earnings management is avoiding fluctuations in the reported earnings. Why 
does a firm want to avoid fluctuations? Strong fluctuations in reported income may influence the 
negotiations with a company‟s workers about their demand of higher wages when there is an increase 
of income, or the debt negotiations as lenders of capital will ask a higher provision for their loans when 
there is a decrease in income. 
As noted above, Hepworth concludes that income smoothing is used to reduce the company‟s 
fluctuations in reported income over time. Gordon claims that the smoothing of income is used “as a 
good tool to estimate future income flows through enhancing the usefulness of accounting information” 
43. Beidleman (1973) is in favour of smoothing income, because “earnings variability is interpreted as an 
important measure of the overall riskiness of the firm and has a direct effect on investors‟ capitalization 
rates and thus, an adverse effect on the value of a firm‟s shares” (p. 654). If the reported earnings 
remain on a constant level, the investor knows his investment will be relatively safe. The analyst, on the 
other hand, sees his analysis of the company to be what he said it would be. Subramanyam (2006) 
argues that smoothing of income in fact improves the value relevance of the reported earnings. 
The second motivation to manage a company‟s reported earnings is the fact that a company wants to 
meet the expectations of the analysts (Bowen et al., 1995; Degeorge et al., 1999; Healy, 1999; 
Hoogendoorn, 2000; Roychowdhury, 2006; Athanasakou et al., 2009). Bowen et al. (1995) test whether 
implicit claims between a firm and its stakeholders influence management‟s accounting method choices. 
They confine their research to four major stakeholder groups of a firm, that is, its customers, suppliers, 
employees, and short-term creditors. They come to the conclusion that the above-mentioned claims 
create incentives for management to choose long-run income-increasing accounting methods 44. 
Degeorge et al. (1999) discuss behavioral thresholds for earnings management, that is, report positive 
profits, sustain recent performance, and meet analysts‟ expectations. The third threshold, meeting 
analysts‟ expectations, comes last in the hierarchy of thresholds, but “most of the time executives meet 
                                               
43 Aljifri, K, (1973), p. 84.  
44 Bowen, R.M., DuCharme, L., Shores, D., (1995), „Stakeholders‟ implicit claims and accounting method choice‟, in: Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 20, pp. 255-295. 
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or slightly exceed analysts‟ forecasts” 45. Roychowdhury (2006) also investigates whether earnings are 
managed in order to meet the expectations of analysts and finds “evidence of real activities 
manipulation to meet annual analyst forecasts” 46. Athanasakou et al. (2009) examine whether UK firms 
engage in earnings management or forecast guidance to ensure that their reported earnings meet 
analyst earnings expectations. They find evidence that a number of large firms increase the probability 
of meeting the analyst expectations by means of downward-guided forecasts.  
The motivations from contractual perspectives are various. The bonus of the manager, for instance, can 
depend on the outcome of the reported earnings (Healy, 1985; Holthausen, 1995). Healy (1985) 
analyzes the bonus schemes of managers and states, that “bonus schemes create incentives for 
managers to select accounting procedures and accruals to maximize the value of their bonus awards. 
These schemes appear to be an effective means of influencing managerial accrual and accounting 
procedure decisions.” 47 Healy divides the bonus schemes into two groups: performance plans and 
bonus schemes. The former is awarded if long-term targets are attained, whereas the latter concerns 
annual targets. The results of Healy‟s tests indicate that bonus schemes and performance plans 
explicitly depend on accounting earnings. 
Holthausen et al. (1995) extend the work of Healy (1985) and go into detail about one of the „contracts 
written in terms of accounting numbers‟ mentioned by Healy, that is the management compensation 
contract. They “find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that managers manipulate earnings 
downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum” 48. 
Langendijk (1998) mentions as specific motivations of managers for earnings management or earnings 
manipulation: a) rewards of management is (partly) earnings dependent, b) concealing weak 
performance of management, c) low earnings may influence wage negotiations with trade unions, d) 
meeting the pressure of institutional investors, e) drawing foreign capital, f) influencing (potential) 
shareholders and financial analysts, and g) decreasing uncertainty and risk 49.  
Healy et al. (1999) mention three of managers‟ reporting incentives, namely, „(1) capital market 
expectations and valuation; (2) contracts written in terms of accounting numbers; and (3) antitrust or 
other government regulation‟ (p. 370). The first incentive, capital market expectations and valuation, 
refers to the pressure of the financial analysts and investors on managers to produce earnings that are 
consistent with the analysts‟ and investors‟ valuation of stocks. Contracting motivations are concerned 
with contracts between the firm and its stakeholders such as the lending contracts and the management 
compensation contracts. The third incentive refers to the regulatory motivations, that is to say the 
industry-specific regulation and the anti-trust regulation.    
The outcome of the reported earnings can also influence contractual renegotiations (DeAngelo et al., 
1994; Jaggi et al., 2002; Saleh et al., 2005). DeAngelo et al. (1994) find that contractual renegotiations, 
either with lenders, unions, government, or management, “provide incentives to reduce reported 
                                               
45 Degeorge, F., J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser, (1999), „Earnings management to exceed thresholds‟, in: Journal of Business, 
Vol. 72, No. I, p. 21. 
46 Roychowdhury, S., (2006), „Earnings management through real activities manipulation‟, in: Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 42, pp. 335-370. 
47 Healy, P., (1985), „The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions‟, in: Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 
7, pp. 106. 
48 Holthausen, R.W., Larcker, D.F., Sloan, R.G., (1995), Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings, in: Journal  
of Accounting and Economics, 19, pp. 29. 
49 Langendijk, H.P.A.J., (1998), De kwaliteit van de winststuring, Een essay over winstbepaling, winststuring alsmede 
winstbestemming, Nyenrode University Press, Breukelen, oratie. 
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earnings” (p. 116). This means in case of renegotiations with lenders that “managers‟ willingness to take 
writeoffs and reduce dividends can help convince lenders that managers are serious about streamlining 
operations, or in labour talks that “losses and dividend reductions can help convince unions to accept 
wage concessions.” Jaggi et al. (2002) investigate whether the severity of financial distress of a firm 
influences the manager‟s choice of income-increasing or income-decreasing discretionary accruals. 
While DeAngelo et al. (1994) argue that managers reduce reported earnings in case of contractual 
renegotiations. Jaggi et al. come to the conclusion that the choice of income-increasing/decreasing 
discretionary accruals depends on the severity of financial distress of a firm. Saleh et al. (2005) find 
evidence that distressed firms manipulate earnings downwards.  
The fourth motivation for earnings management is to reduce tax expenses (Jones, 1991; Phillips et al., 
2003; Holland et al., 2004; Adhirkari et al., 2005; Dyreng et al., 2008). For instance, Jones (1991) “tests 
whether firms that would benefit from import relief attempt to decrease earnings through earnings 
management during import relief investigations by the United States International Trade Commission” 
50. The results of the tests indicate that managers make “income-decreasing accruals during import 
relief investigations in order to increase the likelihood of obtaining import relief and/or increase the 
amount of the relief granted” (p. 193). Phillips et al. (2003) argue that in a number of cases managers 
use their discretion “to manage book income upward without also increasing taxable income” and thus 
generating “temporary book-tax differences” 51. Holland et al. (2004) find that firms manage their 
earnings in order to avoid an earnings decline or a loss by means of under- or over-provision of deferred 
tax. Adhirkari et al. (2005) investigate whether large Malaysian firms with low effective tax rates 
decrease book income prior to a reduction in corporate tax in order to influence tax policy. Their results 
“indicate a positive and significant association between average effective rates in the periods before the 
possible change in tax policy and the change in deferred tax expenses during the period of possible 
change in tax policy” (p.158) and these findings are consistent with prior evidence in the US, that firms 
use accounting choice to realize economic objectives 52. Dyreng et al. (2008) find evidence that a 
number of firms succeed in avoiding income taxes over long periods of time. Although avoidance of 
income over a long period of time may well be considered fraud, most firms have book-tax differences.  
The above-mentioned motivations indicate to a certain extent how earnings management can be 
detected. For instance, in case of deferred tax earnings management can be detected by considering 
the provision of deferred tax in the balance sheet over several periods. Although the above-mentioned 
motivations may also apply to managers of sustainable companies, we assume that loss of reputation 
due to detection of earnings management prevents managers of sustainable companies from managing 
reported earnings of their companies. The various models to discover earnings management are 
discussed in the next section.  
 
 
                                               
50 Jones, J.J., (1991), „Earnings management during import relief investigations‟, in: Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 29, 
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51 Phillips, J., Pincus, M., Rego, S., (2003), Earnings management: New evidence based on deferred tax expense, in: The 
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2.3 Models to detect earnings management 
Some researchers investigating earnings management emphasize the fact that earnings management 
is due to the choice of accounting methods (Langendijk, 2005; Mertens, 1997). As mentioned before, 
the choice of accounting method may influence the value of intangible assets and thus decrease or 
increase the amount of earnings. Earnings management in these cases is best detected by analyzing 
the effects of the choice of accounting rules. Other researchers limit themselves to a specific group of 
companies, for instance banks (Ohlson, 1995; Beatty et al., 1995) or insurance companies (Petroni, 
1992; Petroni et al., 1999). It is clear from the various articles (Dechow et al., 1995; Ohlson, 1995; 
Dechow et al., 2002) that the definition of earnings management has quite an impact on the model that 
is used for testing whether companies manage their reported earnings or not.  
In his dissertation Mertens analyses the number, nature, and magnitude of accounting method changes 
made by firms in the periods before and after the introduction of (1) the Act on Annual Financial 
Statements (Wet op de Jaarrekeningen van Ondernemingen; WJO) implemented in 1971, and (2) the 
Fourth European Economic Community Directive in 1984 (incorporated in the Dutch Civil Code Book 2 
Title 8) on financial reporting practice in the Netherlands. He provides evidence that the introduction of 
those two accounting regulations resulted in a significant increase in the number of accounting 
changes.53  
However, if accounting changes are not due to the choice of accounting method, earnings management 
is hard to prove. It is often as it centers “on managerial intent, which is unobservable” 54. Beidleman 
(1973) proves that detecting the smoothing of reported earnings is common practice with the help of two 
models, the linear and the semi-logarithmic model. The linear model works when the normalizing or 
detrending of reported income may be targeted to grow at a constant rate each year, whereas the 
semilogarithmic model discloses the smoothing of reported earnings that are targeted to grow at a 
certain amount each year. 55 The recent financial crisis and subsequent economic crisis indicate that 
reported income does not grow at a constant rate each year or at a certain amount each year , so that 
the results they produce will be biased (Dechow et al., 1995).  
Other models with which earnings management can be detected are discussed by Bissessur and 
Langendijk (2005) 56. There are three approaches, namely the total accrual-models, the specific accrual-
models, and the behaviour of results around a certain point. They come to the conclusion that it is best 
to determine earnings management by means of a mixture of the three above-mentioned models. 
Dechow et al. (1995) 57 evaluate five accrual-based models to detect earnings management, namely 1) 
Healy Model, 2) DeAngelo Model, 3) Jones Model, 4) Modified Jones Model, en 5) Industry Model. 
Healy‟s Model “tests for earnings management by comparing mean total accruals across the earnings 
management partitioning variable” (p. 197) and it assumes that “systematic earnings management 
occurs in every period” (p. 198). DeAngelo Model is considered “a special case of the Healy Model, in 
which the estimation period for nondiscretionary accruals is restricted to the previous year‟s 
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57 Dechow, P. M., R.G. Sloan & A.P. Sweeney, 1995, „Detecting Earnings Management‟, in: The Accounting Review, April, 
Vol. 70 No. 2, pp. 193-225. 
Do sustainable and non-sustainable companies differ in their extent of earnings management? 
 20 
observation” (p. 198). As both the Healy Model and the DeAngelo Model assume that nondiscretionary 
accruals are constant and are not influenced by changes in economic circumstances, these models are 
considered to produce biased tests results. The Jones Model differs from the Modified Jones Model in 
that it considers revenues as nondiscretionary. However, managers can accrue revenues at the end of 
the year of which the cash has not been received yet, and may never be received. In the Modified Jones 
Model this has been adapted. The last model they discuss is the Industry Model that is set up to detect 
earnings management for firms in the same industry. Dechow et al. conclude that the Modified Jones 
Model has the most power to detect earnings management.  
Nevertheless, there are advantages and disadvantages to both the total accrual-based model and the 
specific accrual-based model. In case of the total accrual-based model, the researcher assumes that 
earnings management occurs in the test period and not in the estimation period, but this assumption 
may prove to be incorrect as the number of situations in which reported earnings can be managed are 
numerous. A second disadvantage is the fact that in order to “estimate firm-specific parameter estimates 
requires a reasonable time series”. 58 As a reasonable time series requires at least 10 years of firm 
data, COMPUSTAT or other data sources may provide smaller samples of firms with sufficient data, and 
then the results may not be representative (McNichols, 2000).  
With the specific accrual-based model the researcher more or less knows with which accrual reported 
earnings have been manipulated, e.g. in case of insurers the loss reserves. Petroni (1992) finds that 
“financially weak insurers tend to underestimate loss reserves relative to companies exhibiting greater 
financial strength”. There are various studies that focus on discretion in loan loss provisions in the 
banking industry (Beatty et al., 1999). However, McNichols also mentions the „potential‟ disadvantages 
of the specific accrual-based model, that is to say, 1) it must be certain that management has used that 
specific accrual to manage the reported earnings, 2) the cost of gathering data specific of an industry is 
higher than of a sample of industries, and 3) the number of firms in which a specific accrual has been 
managed is smaller than the number of firms with total accruals. McNichols concludes that the specific 
accrual-based model is best used for industries in which earnings management is applied in a single or 
a small number of accruals (p. 335). 
This is consistent with Dechow et al. (2002),59 who are convinced that “management intent to 
manipulate” earnings “is unobservable, and likely idiosyncratic and sporadic. They suggest 
concentrating instead on “observable and recurring firm characteristics like volatility of operations, 
because higher volatility is associated with higher incidence of unavoidable estimation errors”.  
According to Schippers 60, the concept of earnings management mainly concentrates on the influence 
and the importance of accounting accruals when estimating the measure of performance of the 
company. Thus, in this thesis the model to detect earnings management is an accrual-based model. 
But, we have to decide which accrual-based model can be used, either the total accrual-based model or 
the specific accrual-based model. 
Healy‟s model differs from other researches on earnings management, as it assumes that systematic 
earnings management takes place in every period. However, from other researches it has become 
apparent that earnings management mostly takes place at the end of the financial year. The DeAngelo 
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model cannot be used as it is seen as a special case of the Healy Model‟ (Dechow et al., 1995) with the 
above-mentioned disadvantages. The Industry Model cannot be used in this thesis, as the research in 
this thesis is sector-neutral. The two models, the Jones Model and the Modified Jones Model, can be 
used for the research in this thesis. In the original Jones model revenues are nondiscretionary, which 
causes “the estimate of earnings management to be biased toward zero” 61.  In the Modified Jones 
Model we assume that “all changes in credit sales in the event period result from earnings 
management” (p. 199). According to Dechow et al. (1995), the Modified Jones Model has the most 
power to detect earnings management. Thus, the Modified Jones Model is used in this thesis for 
detecting the extent to which sustainable companies differ from non-sustainable companies manage the 
earnings they report by means of discretionary and non-discretionary accruals.  
In this chapter the following sub-questions have been discussed: what is earnings management?, what 
are the motivations for earnings management?, and which models are used to detect earnings 
management? Healy‟s definition of earnings management contains two aspects which are essential in 
the current research: 1) the fact that the stakeholder is misled about the outcome of the company‟s 
economic performance, and 2) the fact that it influences certain contracts that underlie the reported 
outcome. We assume that sustainable companies do not manage their reported earnings, as they have 
to take into account the interests of all their stakeholders when doing business and detection of 
earnings management with them may lead to a greater loss of reputation than with non-sustainable 
companies. Besides, the way sustainable companies do business is in conflict with Healy‟s earnings 
management that influences certain contracts that underlie reported outcome. Therefore, Healy‟s 
definition of earnings management is used in this thesis. 
We went into detail about the motivations for earnings management. We assume sustainable 
companies have no or fewer motivations for managing their reported earnings, because the impact of 
detection of earnings management has a great impact on their reputation. However, if the results of this 
research indicate that these companies manage their reported earnings, a further investigation is done 
to find the motivations of the sustainable companies. 
Motivations for earnings management may indicate to a certain extent how earnings management can 
be detected. For instance, in case of deferred tax earnings management can be detected by 
considering the provision of deferred tax in the balance sheet over several periods. We assume that 
sustainable companies do not have as many incentives to manage their reported earnings as non-
sustainable companies or have different motivations. 
Various models to discover earnings management were highlighted. To detect earnings management 
there are, according to Bissessur and Langendijk (2005) 62, three approaches, namely the total accrual-
models, the specific accrual-models, and the behaviour of results around a certain point. They come to 
the conclusion that it is best to determine earnings management by means of a mixture of the three 
above-mentioned models. However, this model has not been developed yet. The model to be used in 
this thesis is the Modified Jones Model, as this model has the most power to detect earnings 
management (Dechow et al. (1995). Besides, our research is sector-neutral and does not focus on a 
particular motivation.  
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62 Bissessur S., Langendijk H.P.A.J., (2005), „Earnings management: de stand van zaken ten aanzien van het 
onderzoeksontwerp‟, in: Financial Accounting, nummer 5 mei. 
Do sustainable and non-sustainable companies differ in their extent of earnings management? 
 22 
In the next chapter we define a sustainable company, we discuss whether there is a relationship 
between a sustainable company and its financial performance, a sustainable company and the way it 
reports its earnings, and whether a sustainable company manages its reported earnings or not.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do sustainable and non-sustainable companies differ in their extent of earnings management? 
 23 
3 Sustainable companies 
As stated in the previous chapter, it is clear that earnings management takes place. The motivations of 
those who manage the reported earnings are numerous, from smoothing earnings to manipulating 
earnings in order to receive a higher bonus. As both the motivations for earnings management and the 
ways of manipulating reported earnings are various, it is rather difficult to detect earnings management 
in spite of the various models to detect earnings management. In order to be able to answer the main 
question the following sub-questions have to be dealt with: 1) what is a sustainable company?, 2) which 
criteria are used to determine whether a company is a sustainable company?, 3) what is the relationship 
between a sustainable company and its financial performance?, and 4) what are the results of earlier 
research with respect to this relationship?  
We assume that there is less earnings management in sustainable companies for reasons that are 
discussed in the following sections. We test this in chapter 4. In this chapter we define what a 
sustainable company is in order to be able to compare the extent to which a sustainable company 
differs from a non-sustainable company in managing their reported earnings. Second, the relationship 
between a sustainable company and its financial performance is highlighted. Third, the relationship 
between a sustainable company and the way it reports its earnings is discussed. Fourth, we go into the 
motivations for earnings management of sustainable companies. Last, we go into the relationship 
between a sustainable company and earnings management. 
 
3.1 The definition of a sustainable company 
Although there is not a clear-cut definition of a sustainable company, scandals such as the bankruptcy 
of Enron and WorldCom, has led to an awareness that companies have a responsibility that goes 
beyond the one to their shareholders.  
Friedman (1970) states that the “social responsibility of business is to increase its profits”.63 This is in 
accordance with the agency theory, that is, that a manager (agent) of a company is employed to serve 
the interests of the company‟s shareholders (owner). Besides, “a corporation cannot have moral 
responsibilities because a corporation is at most an artificial person”. 64 Devinney (2009)65 claims that 
“the socially responsible corporation is a fundamental impossibility,” (p. 53) and he thinks that corporate 
social responsibility „is good because it leashes the entrepreneurial self-interest of inventors, firms, 
managers, and investors to solve social problems.” (p. 49)  
Friedman‟s definition of social responsibility of business is now labelled as amoral.66 Managers would 
hesitate to put their companies‟ goal that straightforward nowadays and many companies focus on a 
wider or different set of goals. Haigh et al. (2007) 67 think that researchers in this field are caught in a 
rudderless Sargossian drift (p. 23), and they argue that business ethicists should speak out against 
capitalism and thus bring about social change. Due to the present financial crisis, this ethical aspect has 
become a hot issue again. Going into the ethical aspect of social responsibility is, however, beyond this 
thesis. 
                                               
63 Friedman, M., (1970), „The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits‟, in: New York Times Magazine. 
64 Kaptein, et al., (2002), p. 112. 
65 Devinney, T.M., (2009), „Is the socially responsible corporation a myth? The good, the bad, and the ugly of corporate 
social responsibility‟, in: Academy of Management Perspectives, May, p. 44-53. 
66 Kaptein, M., Wempe, J., (2002), The Balanced Company, A Theory of Corporate Integrity, Oxford University Press. 
67 Haigh, M., Jones, M.T., (2007), „A Critical Review of Relations between Corporate Responsibility Research and Practice‟, 
in: Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organizations Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1. 
Do sustainable and non-sustainable companies differ in their extent of earnings management? 
 24 
Opposed to the agency theory as supported, among others by Friedman, we find the stakeholder theory 
“which has emerged as the dominant paradigm in corporate social responsibility”. 68 Since Friedman, a 
company is considered to have corporate social responsibility (CSR) that goes beyond economic and 
legal considerations. Carroll (1979) states that “the social responsibility of business encompasses the 
economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a given 
point in time.” 69 Wood (1991) explains that “business and society are interwoven” and “society has 
certain expectations for appropriate business behavior and outcomes.” 70 McWilliams et al. (2001) 
define CSR as “actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and 
that which is required by law”.71 This is quite vague as it can mean anything. Schuler et al. (2006) define 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) “as a voluntary business action that produces social (third-party) 
effects.” 72 Although he considers “corporations as acting in socially responsible ways if they do two 
things. First, they must not knowingly do anything that could harm their stakeholders. Second, if 
corporations do cause harm to their stakeholders, they must then rectify it whenever the harm is 
discovered and brought to their attention.” 73 Aguilera et al. (2007) use the definition of CSR of Davis 
(1973), that is, “the firm‟s considerations of, and response to issues beyond the narrow economic, 
technical, and legal requirements of the firm to accomplish social (and environmental) benefits along 
with the traditional gains which the firm seeks” (p.312). 
It is clear that CSR, as Campbell (2007, p. 950) states, “may mean different things in different places to 
different people and at different times”. We know that many corporations do not behave in socially 
irresponsible ways (Campbell, 2007, p. 947). The definitions given above vary considerably, from 
meeting the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at 
a given point in time (Carroll, 1979), or voluntary business action (Schuler et al., 2008), to meeting 
programs set by a government (CSR Frame of Reference). Besides, when a company takes its CSR, 
this does not mean that it is a sustainable company. 
On the one hand, under pressure of certain developments, such as environmental aspects, global 
warming up, etc, companies start to focus on corporate social responsibility. On the other hand, in spite 
of the fact that a number of companies say, like Friedman (1970), that their only goal is to make profit, 
they do not behave in an irresponsible way. The main problem is that there is not an obligatory format to 
report the social, economic, and environmental achievements of a company. This makes benchmarking 
difficult, and auditing almost impossible. However, the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSI) concept 
of a sustainable company is the best definition there is. The criteria on which these companies have 
been selected are discussed. This thesis, therefore, investigates whether the extent of earnings 
management by sustainable companies, that is those defined by DJSI, differs from earnings 
management by non-sustainable companies.  
There are various Index Series that contain sustainable companies only, such as the FTSE KLD Global 
Sustainability Index Series (KLD Index) 74 and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI). The KLD 
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Index 75 determines with the help of a „best of class‟ methodology on the basis of „environment, social, 
and governance rankings‟ which companies are to be included in its Index Series, taking into account 
the diversity of the companies, that is, neutral as to industry branch and region. The KLD sustainability 
analysis focuses on the fact whether companies „are able to address the social and environmental 
needs of the present without compromising the quality of life of future generations‟. In their ana lysis they 
rank companies as to their „performance‟ related to the following aspects: 1) environment: management 
systems, climate change impact, emissions, and pollution prevention, 2) social: community & society, 
employees & supply chain, and customers, and 3) governance: board structure, executive 
compensation, political accountability, and disclosure 76. KLD checks monthly whether the companies 
included in their KLD Index still meet the KLD selection criteria.  
Beside the KLD Index, we have the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSI). The DJSI is composed by 
SAM Indexes GmbH (the operating company for the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes 77). The DJSI 
describes the concept of „corporate sustainability‟ as „a business approach that creates long-term 
shareholder value by embracing opportunities and managing risks deriving from economic, 
environmental and social developments‟ 78. This implies that the company accepts challenges in the 
following areas: strategy, financial area, customer & product, governance and stakeholder, and human. 
Which criteria do the DJSI use in order to determine which companies are to be included in their Index 
Series? 79 First, they ask the company to fill out a questionnaire. Second, they have an interview with 
the company about the way the company does business. Third, they have a close look at the various 
publishings of the company, such as the annual report, sustainability report, announcements in 
newspapers or magazines about the company. Last, the DJSI determines on the basis of the calculation 
of the free float market cap that companies which meet the above-mentioned criteria, are to be included 
in their Sustainability Index. 
The differences between the KLD Index and the DJSI are the following. First, the KLD Index includes 
companies on the basis of the „best of class‟ methodology, whereas the DJSI selects only the biggest 
sustainable companies. Second, the selection review takes place monthly by the KLD Index and yearly 
by the DJSI.  
These differences indirectly indicate which of the two indexes can be used in the present research. To 
start with, the KLD Index selects on the basis of the „best of class‟ methodology, but which companies 
from the listed non-sustainable companies can be compared with those in the KLD Index? We think it is 
not possible to compose a group of „best of class‟ non-sustainable companies as this methodology is 
used by the KLD Index when selecting sustainable companies. Second, the KLD Index make, if 
necessary, changes monthly, whereas the DJSI reviews the companies quarterly, make an 
„reassessment‟ yearly and make changes, if necessary, in their index only yearly. The present research 
uses quarterly figures of the selected companies. When we use the KLD Index, the monthly changes 
may be such that the population becomes at times too small to produce valid results. Third, the FTSE 
KLD Global Sustainability Index Series was only started in 2007, whereas the DJSI has composed the 
Index for more than 10 years. As the present research focuses on the years 2006, 2007, and 2008, the 
KLD Index cannot be used for the tests.  
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The definition of the DJSI is chosen for two reasons. First, due to the scope of a thesis the DJSI 
definition is more practical, as it is hard to find a group of non-sustainable companies that can be 
compared with the KLD companies selected on the basis of the „best of class‟ methodology. Second, 
the DJSI definition of a sustainable company encompasses more, i.e. a sustainable company creates 
long-term shareholder value by managing risks and grabbing opportunities due to social, economic and 
environmental developments. The KLD sustainable company, on the other hand, is able to meet the 
present social and environmental developments without endangering the lives of future generations. 
The words „long-term‟ and „economic‟ are missing in the KLD definition, whereas these are vital in 
defining a sustainable company. Sustainable indicates that something should be continued, and a 
company must also be able to meet economic developments. Thus, a sustainable company has a 
business approach towards doing business „that creates long-term shareholder value by embracing 
opportunities and managing risks deriving from economic, environmental and social developments‟ 80. 
In the next section we discuss whether there is a relationship between a sustainable company and its 
financial performance. Then we go into the reporting format for a sustainable company and last, we 
discuss whether sustainable company manage their reported earnings.  
 
3.2 Sustainable companies and financial performance 
The relationship between CSR and financial performance has been examined by numerous researchers 
(Pava and Krausz, 1996; Waddock and Graves. 1997; Verschoor, 1998; Roberts and Dowling, 2002; 
Nelling and Webb, 2009). Although various researchers come to the conclusion that the relationship 
between corporate social performance and financial performance is positive, there are other 
researchers who indicate that the relationship is neutral (McWilliams et al., 2001) or even negative. 
McWilliams et al. (2000) point out that in many econometric studies the effect of investment in R&D is 
left out, which leads to incorrect estimates of the financial impact of corporate social responsibility. They 
conclude that when the model is adjusted with the inclusion of investment in R&D in the equation, the 
overall impact of CSR on financial performance is neutral.81 Nelling et al. (2009), on the other hand, use 
different statistical techniques to test if there is a relation between CSR and financial performance and 
find that the relationship is much weaker than previously documented. 82 Wood (1991) states that „every 
firm can be evaluated on its social performance, and a firm‟s social performance can be negatively or 
positively evaluated‟ 83. 
Cochran et al. (1984) first go into previous research on measurement of CSR and measurement of 
financial performance and then mention two generally accepted methods of measuring CSR, that is, the 
reputation index and content analysis. The reputation index is composed by knowledgeable observers 
who rate firms on the basis of one or more dimensions of social performance.84 The advantage of this 
approach is that, on the one hand, the rating will be fairly consistent, but, on the other hand, the rating is 
done by people who may at one point or another be subjective in their rating. As the reputation index is 
fairly comprehensive and requires expert knowledge, it is not used in this thesis. In content analysis “the 
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extent of the reporting of CSR activities in various firm publications and especially in the annual report is 
measured.” 85 However, to what extent can this be measured and are these measurements applicable 
on a global level? The major conclusion of their findings is “that within industry groups the financial 
variable most strongly correlated with CSR is asset age and that omission of this variable results in a 
spurious correlation of CSR and financial performance”.86  
According to Bowen et al. (1995), ongoing implicit claims between a firm and its customers, suppliers, 
employees, and short-term creditors create incentives for management to choose long-run income-
increasing accounting methods.87 They discuss the nature of the incentives, the influence of 
stakeholders‟ implicit claims on accounting method choice, and the alternative incentives for accounting 
method choice (leverage, bonus plans, taxes, and firm size). Although the results of their empirical tests 
reveal a relationship between the implicit claims and the chosen accounting method, they admit that 
there are alternative explanations for their results. Further research will probably focus on firm-specific 
variables that account for the above-mentioned incentives. Although their article highlights the fact that 
a company is accountable to various stakeholders, it does not deal specifically with a sustainable 
company as defined in the previous section. 
McGuire et al. (1988) suggest that two aspects of the relationship between CSR and financial 
performance were ignored in previous research. Therefore they also measure the relationship between 
CSR and financial performance in terms of risk, and whether prior performance is a better predictor of 
CSR than subsequent performance (p. 869). Their findings “show that a firm‟s prior performance, is 
more closely related to CSR than its subsequent performance, and that measures of risk are more 
closely associated with social responsibility than previous studies have suggested”. 88 
Roberts et al. (2002) investigate the relationship between a company‟s reputation and its financial 
performance and the results of their tests “suggest that superior-performing firms have a greater chance 
of sustaining superior performance over time if they also possess relatively good reputations.” 89 They 
consider a good reputation “a valuable asset that allows a firm to achieve persistent profitability, or 
sustained superior financial performance.” (p. 1078). Their research is mentioned here, as their firm‟s 
good reputation contains elements which are similar to those of CSR, that is, asset use, community and 
environmental friendliness, ability to develop and keep key people, product quality. 
Verschoor (1998) finds “a statistically significant positive link between a management commitment to 
strong controls that emphasize ethical and socially responsible behavior on one hand and favorable 
corporate financial performance on the other.”90 He concludes that “a broad corporate concern for 
ethical conduct toward stakeholders is becoming a mainstream management issue in achieving higher 
profitability.” (p. 1515). This finding reflects Friedman‟s statement (1970) that a business must increase 
its profits but for the concern for ethical behavior. Nevertheless, it also reveals the tension between “the 
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purpose of the firm from a contractarian perspective” and the pressure society puts  on companies to 
ameliorate social ills (Margolis et al., 2003)91.  
Hillman et al. (2001) wonder what the bottom line is when a company pays attention to its social 
performance.92 They argue that in order to understand the relationship between social performance and 
financial performance better, social performance is to be separated into two components, namely 
stakeholder management and social issue participation. The difference between the two components is 
that stakeholder management reflects a direct relationship between a company and its stakeholders, 
whereas this relationship is absent with social issue participation. An example of social issue 
participation is when the company does not do business with countries in which the human rights are 
being violated. By means of regression analysis they test their hypotheses with data from the KLD 
database 93 and come to the conclusion that stakeholder management is positively related with 
shareholder value, whereas social issue participation is negatively related.94  
Hull et al. (2008) state that to establish the relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) 
and financial performance is complex and, thus, incorporate in their model the effects of innovation and 
industry differentiation. They come to the conclusion that CSP is beneficial to financial performance (p. 
786). Schnietz et al. (2005), on the other hand, investigate investor reaction to the 1999 World Trade 
Organization failure and find that „a reputation for social responsibility yielded tangible financial benefit.‟ 
They argue that this finding „adds to the growing evidence of a positive corporate social-financial 
performance relationship.‟ 95 
We can conclude that the studies on the relationship between CSR and financial performance are, on 
the whole, positive. Most studies, however, indicate that further research is to be done and is to include 
industry-specific characteristics (Bowen et al., 1985), unobservable firm characteristics (Nelling et al., 
2009), intangible assets (Hirst et al., 2003), or asset age (Cochran et al., 1984). Although most studies 
indicate that there is a relationship between CSR and financial performance, it is not that easy to prove 
it with significant results. This is probably due to the fact that CSR is hard to prove with figures, e.g. 
higher revenues, and often it is not tangible, such as a company‟s good reputation.  
In the next section the relationship between a sustainable company and its reporting is discussed. How 
can a sustainable company report its CSR? Is there a global or standard reporting format? Who decides 
if the CSR reporting is credible? If there is not a standard reporting format for sustainable companies, 
how can sustainable companies be compared with non-sustainable companies? We go into detail about 
this in the next section.  
 
3.3 Sustainable companies and reporting 
Both listed non-sustainable and sustainable companies have to meet the requirements of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for reporting their earnings. Beside the financial report in 
accordance with IFRS, many a company, both sustainable and non-sustainable company, publishes a 
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social report or a sustainability report. Does more information mean more transparency? Arya et al. 
(2003) state that „a problem with transparency is that it can encourage a manager to spend his time 
signaling his ability (posturing), instead of tending to business.96 They further argue that more 
transparency in financial reporting does not necessarily lead to better corporate governance. Bamber et 
al. (2010) investigate whether „firms report comprehensive income in a performance statement, which 
they consider as more transparent, rather than in the statement of equity‟ 97 and they come to the 
conclusion that the managers prefer the less transparent statement of equity. This is consistent with the 
findings of Hunton et al. (2006) that „requiring more transparent financial reporting will shift earnings 
management attempts to areas of lesser transparency.‟98 However, Kothari et al. (2009) find that „the 
market weighs disclosures according the credibility of the source, i.e. negative news disclosure is 
strongly weighted by the market, whereas positive news is discounted as firms and investment analysts 
have incentives to skew disclosure.‟ 99 Thus, more disclosure in reporting has clearly side effects and 
most studies indicate that managers avoid transparency and resort to location choice.100 How is the 
social or sustainability report published by companies evaluated? 
Owen (2005) argues that „increasingly, there is a suspicion that much present-day social reporting 
amounts to little more than a smokescreen, diverting attention from core issues of ethical and moral 
accountability. These core issues include those of: corporate tax avoidance, lobbying activity … 
designed to limit the degree of corporate social and environmental accountability; and the under-funding 
of company pension schemes.‟101 Gray (2006) 102, too, is very skeptical as to the sustainability reports 
published by companies and suggests that companies publish these reports as a sort of window 
dressing.  
When we take a look at various sustainability reports, or social reports, we have to agree that they vary 
considerably in length and contents. If a sustainability report is audited by an independent expert, it will 
benefit the credibility of the report. 103. It is important for the stakeholders of a sustainable company to 
know whether the company publishing a sustainability report is just paying lip service to CSR or the 
company takes CSR seriously. In “KPMG International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting” 
(2005) we find per country lists for mandatory reporting requirements, the main standards and 
guidelines on corporate management and reporting, and the main standards used for assurance on 
environment and sustainability reports. Globally, we have the International Standard for Assurance 
Engagements (ISAE), a standard for assurance on non-financial information, and AA1000 Assurance 
Standard (AA1000AS). Although Gray (2006) is quite pessimistic as to sustainability reports, we have to 
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admit that globally we have to focus on standardization of a sustainability framework and assurance 
rules.  
Many people involved argue that the financial annual report and the sustainability report of a company 
should be combined into one report and should be standardized in order to be able to compare 
companies with each other.104 Finch also states that „traditional accounting has long been criticised for 
providing an incomplete account of business. It fails to present the dynamics of business-value-creating 
activities and how politico-socio factors may affect or be affected by business-value-creating-activities. 
This is evidenced by increasing research in intellectual capital reporting (ICR) and corporate social 
responsibility reporting (CSR) and the introduction of new disclosure frameworks.‟ 105 However, we have 
to bear in mind that the fact that a company publishes a social or a sustainability report, does not 
automatically convert it into a sustainable company.  
There is a long list of frameworks which have been developed to report both ICR and CSR, i.e. The 
Balanced Scorecard, The Jenkins Report, The 21st Century Annual Report, The Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), and ValueReporting.106 On a global level we have the Global Reporting Initiative, which 
was developed by the Coalition for environmental responsible economies (abbreviated CERES) and the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1997. CERES and UNEP wanted to find a 
consensus between the reporting companies and organizations and the users, that is the societal 
organizations, analysts, investors, employees, and competitors, about the way in which to report about 
the economic, environmental, and social achievements of the companies and organizations (the triple 
bottom line). The GRI guidelines contain a set of Economic Performance Indicators (EPI‟s) about what 
to report and also how to report it. However, the EPI‟s are not obligatory. KPMG‟s Sustainability 
Services and the United Nations Environment Programme discuss in detail in “Carrots and Sticks” the 
advantages and disadvantages of both mandatory and voluntary standards for sustainability 
reporting.107 They recommend a publicly recognized set of performance indicators, such as the GRI, 
independent verification, stakeholder engagement, the role of the government in enforcing a level 
playing field, and the importance of incentives.108 In this way, sustainability reports can be compared 
with each other. 
Due to the above-mentioned developments, companies will have to adhere to guidelines that have a 
great impact on their way of doing business. They can, for instance, be held responsible for their 
polluting the environment (Shell sinking the oil rig Brent Spar). They have to make strategic choices as 
far as new markets and new products are concerned.109 Many a company reports both an annual report 
and their ecological, and social-ethical achievements. Graham et al. (2005), on the other hand, argue 
that „firms make voluntary disclosures for three main reasons: (i) to promote a reputation for transparent 
reporting; (ii) to reduce the information risk assigned to the firm‟s stock; and (iii) to address the 
deficiencies of mandatory reporting.‟ 110 These companies can put their reputation at stake, when they 
pollute the environment or employ children. An example of a considerable loss of reputation, and 
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probably resulting in loss of market value is petrol company Total with a factory in Burma.111 As noted 
above, if a company‟s reputation is damaged, this will be reflected in the companies‟ revenues . 
The operational aspects of CSR, as developed by the Dutch Civil Society Organizations (CSO‟s), 
involve supply beside chain responsibilities and stakeholder involvement, transparency and reporting, 
and independent verification.112 As the impact of stakeholders is getting greater113, the two remaining 
aspects of CSR, transparency and reporting, and independent verification, are important. Accountants 
look into the matter of verification and setting up standards with which companies have to comply.114 
Simnett et al. (2009) argue that “sustainability reports” have to be evaluated, for instance, by auditors. 
Ideally, both sustainable and non-sustainable companies should publish an annual report in which the 
economic, social and environmental achievements of companies are reported. However, such a 
framework has not yet been developed, and/or globally accepted and audited. Therefore, we can only 
compare companies with each other which use the same framework, e.g. GRI (globally) or the CSR 
Frame of Reference (the Netherlands). 
To sum up, sustainable companies report, beside financial data, also data on their social and 
environmental achievements. More information, as stated above, does not imply more transparency. In 
that respect they are similar to non-sustainable companies. More research has to be done on how to 
report CSR or sustainability and how this is translated into financial data. 
 
3.4  Sustainable companies and earnings management   
As mentioned in the previous section, there is not an obligatory standard format for reporting a 
company‟s social, economic and environmental achievements, and auditing of those reports is 
recommended in order to do benchmarking. In spite of these difficulties, the question whether 
sustainable companies manage their reported earnings or not, remains to be answered.  
Prior et al. (2008) investigate the relationship between earnings management and CSR. They find that 
managers who manipulate reported earnings resort to CSR practices in order to ward off stakeholders 
activism and vigilance.115 So, those managers hide behind CSR to cover up their manipulating reported 
earnings (managerial entrenchment). Baron (2001) develops a model which „implies that firms should 
seize any opportunities for strategic CSR just as they seize market opportunities to improve profits. 
Moreover, it implies that firms with altruistic preferences should go beyond the point at which profits are 
maximized. The model also cautions that responding to altruistic preferences weakens CFP (corporate 
financial performance) and that may come to the attention of the market for control.‟ 116 These findings 
are consistent with Cespa et al. (2007) when they claim that „incumbent managers under a tough 
replacement threat may in fact use relationships with stakeholder activists as an effective entrenchment 
                                               
111 CMIBRIEF, (2007), Corporate Social Responsibility of Multinational Corporations, January, Volume 6 No.2. 
112 MVO-platform, (2003), CSR Frame of Reference, July. 
113 Het Financieele Dagblad, Belang maatschappelijk rendement neemt toe, 26-07-2006. 
114 KPMG‟s Sustainability Services and the United Nations Environment Programme, (2006), Carrots and Sticks for Starters, 
Current trends and approaches in Voluntary and Mandatory Standards for Sustainability Reporting.  
115 Prior, D., Surroca, J., Tribó, J.A., (2008), „Are socially responsible managers really ethical? Exploring the relationship 
between earnings management and corporate social responsibility‟, in: Corporate Governance, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 160-177. 
116 Baron, D.P., (2001), „Private politics, corporate social responsibility, and integrated strategy‟, in: Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy, Vol. 10, p. 41. 
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strategy.‟ 117 These studies, in fact, indicate that companies resort to CSR in order to hide their 
manipulating reported earnings.  
However, sustainable companies do not have to put on the disguise of CSR for various reasons. First, 
their way of doing business reflects CSR. A sustainable company has to take into account the interests 
of its stakeholders, which may mean that the manager‟s bonus plan (Healy et al., 199) will not easily 
lead to manipulating the company‟s reported income.  Second, detection of earnings management leads 
to loss of reputation and affects the company‟s bottom line (Vander Bauwhede, 2003). Third, CSR 
affects a company‟s bottom line (Vander Bauwhede, 2003; Aguilera et al, 2007; Prior et al, 2008). Thus, 
we assume that there will be less earnings management by sustainable companies, as the impact is 
greater. Although this does not mean that sustainable companies do not manage their reported 
earnings, the extent to which the reported earnings are managed might be lesser than by non-
sustainable companies. This will be tested in chapter 4.  
In the previous sections, we first defined a sustainable company. A sustainable company takes care of 
all its stakeholders and does business in a way that is not harmful to future generations. Besides, it 
entails a business approach towards doing business „that creates long-term shareholder value by 
embracing opportunities and managing risks deriving from economic, environmental and social 
developments‟ 118. Second, we looked into the relationship between a sustainable company and its 
financial performance, which is positive although more research has to be done, for instance, on firm-
specific characteristics. Third, the relationship between a sustainable company and its reporting was 
discussed. Reporting more data does not improve a company‟s CSR behaviour and does not imply 
more transparency. Besides, there is not a standard, globally accepted, framework with which a 
company reports its economic, social and environmental performance. To make sure this report is 
credible and possibly used for benchmarking, assurance must also be standardized. In this last section 
we find that CSR can be used as a means to cover up earnings management.  
In the next chapter we focus on the strategy of research. We formulate our two hypotheses and 
delineate the sample of both sustainable and non-sustainable companies. The gathering of data is 
discussed in detail, that is to say which data are to be gathered and from which database. We explain 
the Modified Jones Model, and which data are needed for its formula.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
117 Cespa, G., Cestone, G., (2007), „Corporate social responsibility and managerial entrenchment‟, in: Journal of Economics 
and Management Strategy, Vol. 16, No. 3, p. 766. 
118 www.sustainability-index.com 
Do sustainable and non-sustainable companies differ in their extent of earnings management? 
 33 
4. Strategy of research 
 
It appears, and as stated in chapter 2, that earnings management occurs (Beidleman, 1973; Schipper, 
1989; Healy et al., 1999). The main question to be answered in this thesis is: “Do sustainable 
companies and non-sustainable companies differ in the extent of managing their reported earnings?” In 
order to test our hypothesis we use the desk research strategy (Verschuren, 2001, p. 184). Earnings 
management has been investigated extensively, and also the relationship between CSR and financial 
performance. We make use of existing data, gathered by CompuStat Global.  
In scientific research the empirical cycle can consist of five phases.119 In the first phase we find 
observation, that is, the gathering and ordering of the empirical facts. The second phase deals with 
induction, that is to say that hypotheses about the empirical facts are being formulated. In the next 
phase we deduce from the hypotheses formulated in phase 2 special consequences in the form of 
assumptions that can be tested. The hypotheses are then being tested in order to find out whether or 
not the predictions are true. In the last phase the evaluation takes place: the researcher discusses the 
outcome of the testing as to the set hypotheses, and where appropriate outlines theories to potential 
new, contiguous research.  
In this thesis these phases are followed in the above-mentioned order. In section 1, the hypotheses are 
formulated and from these hypotheses we deduct assumptions that are to be tested. In section 2 the 
criteria which data to include in the empirical research are discussed. Data gathering is extensively dealt 
with in section 3.  
 
4.1 Hypotheses 
In this section we discuss the hypotheses for our research. We want to test whether there is a difference 
in the extent to which sustainable and non-sustainable companies manage their earnings. 
Ho =  There is no difference in the extent of earnings management between sustainable and 
non-sustainable companies.  
The null hypothesis implies that both sustainable (DJSI sample) and non-sustainable (S&P Global BMI) 
companies manage their earnings to the same extent. 
Sustainable companies report more information about their company, which may indicate that they are 
more transparent than non-sustainable companies as far as their reported earnings are concerned. 
Besides, they are accountable to not only their shareholders, but also to their stakeholders, such as for 
instance, their customers and employees. Thus, we assume that sustainable companies do not manage 
their reported earnings. This assumption leads to the first hypothesis. 
 
H1 = There is difference in the extent of earnings management between sustainable and 
non-sustainable companies. 
 
                                               
119 Dr H. de Man, (2001), „Methodologische keuzen in bedrijfswetenschappelijk onderzoek: een palet voor de onderzoeker‟, 
pp.1-25, in: Methoden en Technieken van Bedrijfswetenschappelijk Onderzoek, OUNL, februari. 
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The alternative hypothesis assumes that there is earnings management in both sustainable and non-
sustainable companies but there is a difference in the extent to which earnings are managed. 
In the next section we discuss the model used for testing the above-mentioned hypotheses.  
 
4.2 Data processing and analysis 
Reported earnings can be managed in various ways such as changes in accounting methods, changes 
in capital, and by means of accruals. We test earnings management with the help of the time-series 
accrual-based model, because „accruals provide managers with a means of managing reported 
earnings‟. 120 The model used in this thesis is the Modified Jones model that „attempts to control for the 
effect of changes in a firm‟s economic circumstances on nondiscretionary accruals‟ (Dechow et al., 
1995). We choose the Modified Jones model as it „implicitly assumes that all changes in credit sales in 
the event period result from earnings management‟ (Dechow et al., 1995) and estimates „discretionary 
accruals that have the attributes of accruals resulting from management opportunism or accruals 
enhancing earnings as a performance measure‟. 121 Credit sales can be used by managers to make out 
the company‟s profit better than it really is, and they may never take place in the next period/year.  
The panel data tests are done with the help of the software programme SPSS. If necessary, adaptations 
are made in order to ensure that the results of the tests are valid.  
The Jones Model assumes that „nondiscretionary accruals‟ are stable, that is, profits and/or losses 
reported in the current book year are being paid/received next year. It is almost certain that these profits 
and/or losses are being paid or received. The model attempts to control for the changes in the economic 
circumstance of a company in the following „expectation model‟: 122 
 
TAit/Ait-1 = αi[1/Ait-1] + β1i [ΔREVit/Ait-1] + β2i[PPEit/Ait-1] +εit  
 
where: 
 
TAit = total accruals in year t for firm i, 
ΔREVit  = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i, 
PPEit  = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i, 
Ait-1 = total assets in year t-1 for firm i, 
εit = error term in year t for firm i, 
i = 1, … , N firm index (N = 65 companies, both sustainable and non-sustainable), 
                                               
120 Guay, W.R., Kothari, S.P., Watts, R.L., 1996, „A market-based evaluation of discretionary accrual models‟, in: Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol.34, Supplement, pp. 83-105. 
121 Guay et al., 1996, p. 104. 
Compustat has gathered financial data for over 35 years from 42.000 public companies, 518.000 private companies and 
9.500 private capital firms,121 which means that the data are consistent and the database is easily accessible. 
122 Jones, J.J., (1991), „Earnings management during import relief investigations‟, in: Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 
29, No. 2 Autumn, p.211. 
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t = 1, … , Ti, year index for the years included in the estimation period for firm i (Ti ranges in my 
thesis between Quarter 1 (Q1) of the year 2005 to Q4 of the year 2008). 
 
In the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) the „revenues‟ are considered as discretionary 
instead of „nondiscretionary‟ accruals, as it is not sure whether the (expected) revenues will take place. 
In this model the nondiscretionary accruals are estimated during the event period as  
 
 NDAt = αi (1/Ait-1) + αi (ΔREVt – ΔRECt )+ α(PPEt )    (1) 
 
where: 
 
ΔRECt = net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1 scaled by total assets at t-1123. 
 
In order to calculate the total accruals we use the formula: 
 
 TAit = (ΔCAit – ΔCLit – Δcashit + ΔSTDit – Depit )     (2) 
    Ait-1 
The total of accruals is the difference in current assets (CompuStat item 4) minus the difference in cash 
(CompuStat item 1) minus the difference in current liabilities (CompuStat item 5) plus the change in debt 
included in current liabilities (CompuStat item 34) minus the depreciation and amortization expense 
(CompuStat item 14) 124.  
The following data have to be gathered for both the DJSI components and S&P Global BMI components 
for the formulaes mentioned above: 
 
total accruals in period t for firm i,  
revenues in period t less revenues in period t-1 for firm i, 
current assets in period t less current assets period t-1 for firm i, 
cash in period t less cash in period t-1 for firm i, 
current liabilities in t less current liabilities in period t-1 for firm i, 
depreciation and amortization expense in period t, 
gross property, plant, and equipment in period t for firm i,  
total assets in year t-1 for firm i, 
net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1 scaled by total assets at t-1. 
                                               
123 Dechow et al., 1995, p. 199. 
124 Dechow et al., 1995, p. 211. 
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In order to ensure the quality of our research we pay attention to the aspects reliability and validity. 
Reliability is influenced by checking the results of the tests on outliers which distort the outcome of the 
tests, and the absence of random errors. Outliers can also result from errors while downloading from the 
database CompuStat. Working with real life data from big databases may result in certain typing errors 
made during the generation of the database. Statistical methods allow a certain measure of corruption 
of data because these are filtered out assuming that that type of error is randomly distributed. With 
respect to the above-mentioned aspect we verify and double-check the data before processing them in 
the computer. Besides, we use statistical procedures to adjust for such errors.125  
In this thesis data are gathered in a time-series of 12 quarters. Jeter et al. (1999) argue that a time-
series model such as the Jones model requires at least ten observations in the estimation period to 
obtain minimally reliable parameters estimates (p. 301). In accordance with Verschoor (1998), “a broad 
corporate concern for ethical conduct toward stakeholders is becoming a mainstream management 
issue in achieving higher profitability.” (p. 1515). In this period of 10 years not only the way companies 
do business may have changed considerably, but also the national and international accounting rules. 
The current research covers a period of 3 years of 4 quarters each. Extending  the time era over a 
longer horizon than 3 years, or 12 quarters, may affect the assumed distribution of the statistical data.  
This influences the effectiveness of the application. Besides, we process different observations of the 
same test and we find the same results, it implies that the reliability of the research is secured. 
Validity refers to the question whether there are no systematic errors in the tests and can be divided into 
the validity of the observation and the validity of the conclusion. Validity of the observation entails the 
question whether the „concept-as-defined‟ corresponds with the „concept-as-meant‟. In chapter 5 the 
question of the validity of our observation is answered. The validity of the conclusion refers to the 
question whether an answer to the research question can be correctly distilled from the observations. 126 
There are various aspects to the validity of the conclusion, i.e. statistical conclusion validity, internal 
validity, external validity, and the construct validity. To ensure the statistical conclusion validity we 
carefully check the processing of the tests, for instance when entering the data in SPSS, and critically 
going through the phases of the testing several times to avoid systematic errors. For the internal validity 
we check whether the statistical results of our research give rise to further testing and/or interpretation. 
The external validity is dealt with by answering the question whether the statistical results of our tests is 
also applicable to the remaining companies in S&P‟s Global BMI. Here we have to investigate whether 
other factors have had an impact on the data in the years 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
We discussed the various procedures to ensure that the results of our tests are reliable and valid. In the 
next section we determine the population of both the sustainable and non-sustainable companies before 
we test the hypotheses with the Modified Jones Model. 
 
4.3 Data gathering 
The practical part of data gathering is concerned with a survey research, that is, a quantitative analysis. 
In order to find out if non-sustainable companies manage the reporting of their company‟s earnings to 
the same extent as sustainable companies, we have to delineate which companies are to be included in 
the research. We stated in chapter 3 that the companies in the DJSI meet the criteria of a sustainable 
company and thus form the population of sustainable companies.  
                                               
125 http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/measerr.php 
126 http://www.leidenuniv.nl/fsw/psychologielexicon/index.php3-c=98.htm 
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We composed the population of sustainable companies as follows. The Sam-Indexes group provided us 
with the component lists of the DJSI World. The number of companies in the DJSI World as of 31 
December 2006 was 316, and 317 sustainable companies as of 31 December 2007. We compared 
these two lists of sustainable companies with each other and removed those companies from the lists 
that appeared only in either 2006 or 2007. The number of companies that remained was 268 
companies. As the DJSI reviews the enlisted companies each year in September, the additions, that is 
the companies that were added in September 2006, were also removed from the lists, which resulted in 
a list of 231 sustainable companies. After having run queries in both CompuStat Global and CompuStat 
North America database which resulted in a list of 231 companies, 69 sustainable companies from the 
CompuStat North America database and 162 from the CompuStat Global database. We removed 
companies with a different fiscal year, and those that were inactive, which left us with a list of 44 
sustainable companies from the CompuStat North America database and 79 from CompuStat Global.  
However, when we ran queries for 79 sustainable companies in CompuStat Global, only 65 companies 
returned quarterly data on the required variables. Running queries for the 44 companies from the 
CompuStat North America database turned out to be dramatic, as the number of companies dwindled 
down to a mere 9 sustainable companies. Out of these 9 companies there were 4 companies from the 
financial sector.  
The DJSI is composed of the biggest sustainable companies on the basis of free float market cap. 
However, as the data needed to calculate the free float market cap was not readily available in the 
CompuStat databases, we calculated the market value by multiplying the number of outstanding shares 
with the closing price per share at 31 December 2006. We submitted our query to the complete 
database of CompuStat Global, but there were no results for both 30 and 31 December 2006. The 
query submitted with 29 December 2006 as date resulted in a list of more than 20.000 companies, both 
sustainable and non-sustainable. Before calculating the market value, we removed companies from this 
list that gave no information on the number of shares, sector code, and/or country code.  
We first calculated the market value of the sustainable companies taking into account the exchange 
rates of the various currencies on 31 December 2006. As stated above, out of our list of 79 sustainable 
companies only 65 sustainable companies returned quarterly data on the variables required for the 
formula in the Modified Jones Model in order to determine earnings management.  
Before we can compare the population of the non-sustainable companies with the above-mentioned list 
of 65 sustainable companies, we have to select a similar group of non-sustainable companies. We ran a 
query on the whole database of CompuStat Global which resulted in a list of more than 20.000 
companies. We removed the DJSI sustainable companies, the companies that missed relevant data, 
the companies which had a different fiscal year, the companies in countries that are absent in the list of 
65 sustainable companies, and the companies with a sector code absent in the list of the 65 sustainable 
companies. The result of this selecting was a list of more than 400 companies. In order to avoid random 
selection we decided to select the non-sustainable companies with market values comparable to those 
of sustainable companies. We find the samples of sustainable and non-sustainable companies in 
Appendices A and B, with sector and country added.  
As the quarterly data in the CompuStat Global database are in the currency used by companies to 
report their financial data, we converted all financial data of both sustainable and non-sustainable 
companies that were not in euros into euros at the exchange rates at the end of each quarter. 
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We use quarterly data as „quarterly data provide a sharper focus on the event, which could increase the 
likelihood of detecting earnings management.‟ 127 Our research consists of panel data tests as the 
observation of data covers more than one period.128 The financial quarterly data of the selected 
companies are examined in the years 2006 and 2007. The reason for these years is that in 2005 the 
guideline ISAE3000 became mandatory. The ISAE3000 provides a framework in which accounting 
professionals can deliver sustainability assurance on (selected) information (or assertions) reported by 
the client and, in so doing, applies the principles of materiality, completeness and responsiveness to the 
pre-determined “subject matter” (scope).129  In order to avoid the impact of the above-mentioned 
guideline, our research is restricted to the years 2006 and 2007. As we want to compare Q1 2006 with 
Q1 2007, we need data of Q4 2005 in order to be able to calculate total accruals, non-discretionary and 
discretionary accruals of Q1 2006.  
Although our research is restricted to 2 years, or that is to say, 8 quarters, this is a limitation. Jeter et al. 
(1999) state that „time-series models (such as the Jones model) require at least ten observations in the 
estimation period to obtain minimally reliable parameters estimates.‟130 A solution to this problem is to 
include Q1 to Q4 of 2008 in spite of the fact that the financial crisis started in 2008. This crisis has had 
an enormous impact on the companies‟ earnings, and thus may cause outliers in our research. Dechow 
et al. (1995) state that “when the models are applied to samples of firm-years experiencing extreme 
financial performance, all models lead to misspecified tests.” 131. However, the impact was only 
apparent for companies of the financial sector in 2008. In 2009 the impact of the crisis spread to 
companies in other sectors. Thus, we can include quarterly data of 2008 of companies except for those 
from the financial sector. 
Another reason for including the data of 2008 can be further argued as follows. As stated above, while 
gathering data for the list of 123 sustainable companies, we had to consult the database CompuStat 
North America. The queries we ran, resulted in a list of only 14 companies out of the 44 sustainable 
companies on our list. Besides, the results of the queries we ran, gave mixed results and missing data 
and/or outliers for the year 2008. Therefore, if we exclude companies from the financial sector, we can 
include the year 2008 in our research and have 12 quarters which is more than „at least ten years‟ (Jeter 
et al., 1999). Besides, companies from the financial sector do not give results on data such as Property, 
Plant and Equipment which impacts the results of the other companies, both sustainable and non-
sustainable companies. Burgstahler et al. (1997) state that „Banks, financial institutions, and firms in 
regulated industries … were deleted‟, because „for financial institutions, incentives to avoid earnings 
decreases or losses may be linked to regulatory oversight. 132  
The number of investigation periods is twelve, and the number of companies, both sustainable and non-
sustainable companies, is 65. The number of observations is in total 1560 observations. In the Jones 
model we find data from a prior period (t - k) as a measure of the “normal” data 133. The Modified Jones 
                                               
127 Jeter, D.C., Shivakumar, L., (1999), „Cross-sectional estimation of abnormal accruals using quarterly and annual data: 
effectiveness in detecting event-specific earnings management‟, in: Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 29, No. 4, p. 
300. 
128 Verschuren et al., (2001), pp. 153-160. 
129 Iansen-Rogers, J., Oelschlaegel, J., (2005),  Assurance Standards Briefing, AA1000Assurance Standard ξ ISAE3000, 
AccountAbility and KPMG, p. 20. 
130 Jeter, D.C., Shivakumar, L., 1999, p. 301. 
131 Dechow, (1995), p. 223. 
132 Burgstahler, D., Dichev, I., 1997,  „Earnings management to avoid decreases and losses‟, in: Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 24, pp. 101. 
133 Jones, J.J., 1991, p. 214. 
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Model distinguishes between two periods, that is, the estimation period („in which no systematic 
earnings management is hypothesized‟) and the event period („in which earnings management is 
hypothesized‟). This means for our research that we have to estimate accruals for 12 quarters prior to 
the first quarter of 2006. Jeter et al. (1999), for instance, includes in his research the data of 10 years 
prior to the 10 years of investigation. However, this is not feasible in our research as this includes the 
years 2003 and 2004, years in which the guideline ISAE3000 had not been introduced yet. This was 
only introduced in 2005. Therefore, we have to limit ourselves to the data of Q1 up to Q4 of 2005 and 
calculate the firm specific parameters for the regression (formula 1) with the outcome of calculations of 
Q2 up to Q4 2005. We cannot calculate the data for Q1 2005 as we need the data of Q4 2004. The fact 
that we cannot estimate accruals for 12 quarters prior to the first quarter of 2006 is a limitation in our 
research and it may invalidate the results.  
Emphasis is on non-discretionary accruals. Which accounting accruals are used by non-sustainable 
companies to portray their results more favourable than they really are? In the tests we examine total 
accruals of the sustainable companies. The total accruals are decomposed into expected (or non-
discretionary) accruals and abnormal (or discretionary) accruals. We also run these tests for the non-
sustainable companies selected in order to be able to compare those results with the results of 
sustainable companies. 
The results of these populations of both DJSI and S&P‟s Global BMI used in this thesis are investigated 
carefully, as the factor region may impact the difference in the extent to which earnings are managed by 
sustainable and non-sustainable companies. This also applies to industry branches that are sufficiently 
large enough in both the DJSI and S&P‟s Global BMI population. Both have to be assessed for the 
current research. 
The population of both sustainable and non-sustainable companies have been delineated (see 
Appendices A and B for the complete lists of sustainable and non-sustainable companies). Our 
research covers 12 quarters, i.e. 2006 up to and including 2008 and concerns 65 sustainable and 65 
non-sustainable companies. Our research will thus cover 1560 observations. We discussed the 
limitations of our research, that is to estimate the parameters we can use only 3 quarters prior to the 
period 2006-2008 instead of 12 quarters, and we have to limit ourselves to the years 2006-2008 due to 
the financial crisis and the introduction of ISAE3000 in 2005. The processing of the data and the 
analysis of the tests are discussed in the next chapter. 
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5. Results  
 
We discussed our strategy of research, the hypotheses and the data processing. We delineated the 
population of both the sustainable and non-sustainable companies and highlighted the limitations of the 
current research. In this section we begin with verifying the data before we process them in SPSS. 
Second, we execute tests of normality to check whether the data as such meet the assumptions 
underlying the statistics of the multiple regression of the Modified Jones Model. Third, if the tests on 
normality do not give satisfactory results, the data can be transformed. Four, we run the panel data tests 
on earnings management, verify the results, and do extra tests in order to ensure the validity of the 
tests. Finally, we report our findings. 
We started by checking the data to be used in the formulae on irregularity, that is to say whether there 
were great differences between the data of one quarter and those of the following/previous period. We 
found some striking differences, but these were in line with the other data of a particular firm. For 
instance, the data of the sustainable company Akzo Nobel for Q4 2007 showed an enormous increase 
in Cash and cash equivalents compared to Q3 2007 figures but this “was mainly attributable to the net 
proceeds from the divestment of Organon BioSciences” 134. Some data for sustainable companies were 
missing, such as for instance the data on depreciation in one quarter, but it turned to be the case for 
similar non-sustainable companies in the same sector and in the same period. We further checked the 
data of both sustainable and non-sustainable companies per quarter with the help of a line graph. These 
line graphs did not show striking differences between sustainable and non-sustainable companies, 
except for the fact that the figures of the sustainable companies ranged from zero to 300 million euro, 
whereas those of the non-sustainable companies ranged from zero to 800 million euro. This might 
impact the outcome of the tests on earnings management. 
Before running the panel data tests, we calculated the total accruals of each company for each quarter, 
that is to say for Q2 of 2005 up to and including Q4 of 2008, using the following formula: 
TAit = (ΔCAit – ΔCLit – Δcashit + ΔSTDit – Depit )      
     Ait-1 
The total accruals are defined as the difference in current assets minus the difference in cash minus the 
difference in current liabilities plus the change in debt included in current liabilities minus the 
depreciation and amortization expense. The outcomes of the total accruals of each company were then 
scaled by lagged total assets and put in a line graph to assess normality (Appendix C). We found no 
striking differences between the outcomes total accruals for sustainable and non-sustainable companies 
or abnormalities in the line graphs of each population separately. The outcomes of Q2 and Q3 of 2005, 
however, differed greatly from each other, which was mainly due to the fact that many data of Q1 of 
2005 were missing. This may be caused by the introduction of the IASE3000 accounting guideline in 
2005. As the results of Q2 and Q3 of 2005 are that different, we determine Q4 of 2005 as the estimation 
period. We realize that this is a severe limitation of our research.  
We then calculated separately for each company in each quarter the variables of the formula 
 
 TAit/Ait-1 = αi[1/Ait-1] + β1i [ΔREVit/Ait-1 - ∆REC it/Ait-1] + β2i[PPEit/Ait-1] +εit 
                                               
134 Akzo Nobel, Year of Transformation, Annual report 2007, p. 19. 
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as follows: 1 divided by Ait-1(total assets of the previous quarter), the change in revenues scaled by 
lagged total assets minus the change in receivables scaled by lagged total assets, and property, plant, 
and equipment scaled by lagged assets. We analyzed the dependent variable for both sustainable and 
non-sustainable companies with the help of SPSS in order to assess whether the distribution of scores 
on the dependent variable is „normal‟. The output of the Tests of Normality gave the results of the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (Appendix D). „A Sig. value of more than .05 indicates normality‟ 135. In our 
case the Sig. value is less than .05 suggesting violation of the assumption of normality. 
A further indication that the distribution of the scores on the dependent variable is not „normal‟, is 
demonstrated by the Normal Q-Q Plots and the Detrented Q-Q Plots. In the former the observed value 
for each score is plotted against the expected value from the normal distribution and shows a 
reasonably straight line when the distribution is normal. The Normal Q-Q Plots of our research do not 
show a „reasonably‟ straight line. As for the Detrended Q-Q Plots, we detect a random picture of the 
plots which also indicates that the distribution is not normal. These observations are a severe setback 
for our research as we cannot execute a linear regression as mentioned in the Modified Jones model 
when there is no normal distribution (Appendix E). 
The tests to assess normality also produced statistics on skewness and kurtosis. „The Skewness value 
provides an indication of the symmetry of the distribution‟ and „kurtosis provides „peakedness‟ of the 
distribution‟ (Pallant, 2007, p.56). In our tests we found both positive and negative skewness which 
emphasizes our earlier findings that the distribution of our populations is not normal. The results of 
kurtosis is in all quarters above 0, but ranges from 1 to 16 which means that „the distribution is rather 
peaked (clustered in the centre), with long thin tails‟ (Pallant, 2007, p.56). However, we have to bear in 
mind that our population is a small sample so that our results on kurtosis „can result in an underestimate 
of the variance‟ (Pallant, 2007, p.56). 
In spite of the above-mentioned setbacks, we then requested scatterplots in SPSS for Q4 of 2005 and 
all quarters of the years 2006, 2007, and 2008 in order to explore the relationship between the 
dependent variable and each of the independent variables. A possible linear relationship between two 
variables is noticeable by an elliptic form of the scatterplot. In the scatter plots with TA it/Ait-1 as the 
dependable variable, and (ΔREVit - ∆REC it)/Ait-1 as the independent variable, the figure of the dots can 
be described as a sort of a cloud, that is to say a cluster of dots mostly on one side of the scatterplot 
and vertical without any noticeable linear relationship. In the case of TAit/Ait-1 and PPEit/Ait-1,  we found 
the dots horizontally outstretched round 0 for the independent variable, and for the dependent variable 
outstretched from 0 to 0,8. The dots were spread in a figure similar to the first scatterplot (TAit/Ait-1 and 
ΔREVit - ∆REC it)/Ait-1), although mostly on the left hand side of the scatterplot. On the whole, the 
outcomes of the scatterplots do not indicate a linear relationship. 
Although scatterplots indicated that there is hardly any linear relationship between the dependent and 
the independent variable, we calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient in SPSS in order to make 
sure that what is visually apparent is supported by facts. In nearly all quarters we find Pearson 
correlation coefficients which are, according to Cohen 136, mostly small negative or positive coefficients. 
The results confirm the outcomes of the scatter plots mentioned above, that is to say that there is hardly 
any noticeable linear relationship between the dependent and the independent variables in any of the 
quarters. We expect that there is a linear relationship between the dependent variable and the 
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independent variables. For instance, if the expense on property, plant and equipment, PPE, increases, 
the amount of total accruals decreases. However, both the scatter plots and the Pearson correlation 
coefficient indicate that there is hardly any linear relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables.  
To sum up our findings so far, the outcomes of the descriptive statistics were disappointing. The tests of 
Normality suggested a serious violation of the assumption of normality. This was also confirmed by the 
Normal Q-Q Plots which did not show a straight line, by the Detrended Q-Q Plots which showed a 
random picture of the plots, by the strong negative and positive figures for skewness, and by a very 
peaked kurtosis. Subsequent analyzing of the scatter plots revealed that there is hardly any noticeable 
linearity. This implies that our research does not meet the assumptions of the statistics we want to use, 
that is to say the multiple regression as given in the Modified Jones Model. 
As „only linear relationships are suitable for correlation analyses (Pallant, p. 72), we have three options 
according to Pallant (2007, p. 110). The first one is to use the parametric technique (multiple regression 
in our research) and hope it does not seriously invalidate our findings. The second option is to transform 
the dependent variable mathematically using the formulas square root, logarithm, and inverse. The last 
option is to use non-parametric techniques. The first option feasible is not feasible, because the results 
of the multiple regression may not be valid. So, we started with the second option, namely transform the 
data. Unfortunately, the results of these „transformations‟ gave about 50% missing data. As none of the 
descriptive statisticals discussed above meet the assumptions underlying the statistics of the multiple 
regression of the Modified Jones Model, we resort to non-parametric techniques to further analyse our 
data.   
We executed non-parametric tests, such as the Mann-Whitney U Test and the Kruskal-Wallis Test, in 
order to find the cause of the non-linearity of the data. The Mann-Whitney Test is used to test 
differences between two independent groups on a continous measure by comparing medians. 137 For 
our research it implies that we want to test whether the sample of sustainable companies differs from 
the one of non-sustainable companies with respect to, for instance, total accruals. In neither of the 
quarters 138 is the probability value (p) less than or equal to .05 which indicates that statistically there is 
not a significant difference in the amounts of total accruals of sustainable and non-sustainable 
companies (Pallant, p. 222). In the Kruskal-Wallis Test scores are converted to ranks and the mean 
rank for each group is compared. 139 
The non-linearity of our data may be caused by incorrect data from queries run in CompuStat, by 
probable mistakes on our side when working in excel sheets, or calculating with the wrong exchange 
rate. In order to avoid overlooking a possible cause, such as multiplying Swedish krones by the 
exchange rate of the English pound, for the non-linearity of our data, we compare the data from the 
different sectors in our populations with each other. For instance, the total accruals of both the 
sustainable and non-sustainable companies in each sector are compared with each other by means of 
the Kruskal-Wallis test in SPSS. The significance level of our sample is higher than the alpha level of 
.05, which suggests that there is no statistically significant difference in the total accruals of the 
sustainable and non-sustainable companies (Appendix D). We have now excluded the impact of sector 
on the total accruals for both samples. 
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The multiple regression of the Modified Jones Model cannot be run, because the non-linearity of the 
data will seriously invalidate the findings. Besides, the current research has come about a number 
limitations our data do not meet the assumptions underlying the statistics of the multiple regression of 
the Modified Jones Model at all. The first limitation was inherent in the delineation of our population of 
sustainable companies.  
From scientific literature it is clear that earnings management can be detected (Beidleman, 1973; 
Petroni, 1992; Dechow et al., 1995 Ohlson, 1995; Bissessur et al. 2005). Our research was meant to 
give results on earnings management for both sustainable and non-sustainable companies, but this did 
not to turn out to be feasible. The first hindrance we met when setting up our research is the guideline 
ISAE3000 introduced in the year 2005 which brought down the number of years under surveillance. As 
a time-series of 10 years (Jeter et al., 1999) is considered as the minimum for a research as the current 
research, we focused on the quarterly data of 3 years. However, it was not possible to include 10 
periods prior to the event period due to the introduction of the above-mentioned guideline.  
The second limitation was the number of companies in our sample of sustainable companies. The 
number of companies in DJSI is about 315, but this number dwindled to a mere 65 which was among 
others due to different bookyears, missing data, and different databases (CompuStat Global and 
CompuStat North America). Although there are different guidelines for sample size, the outcomes may 
not generalize with other samples (Pallant, 2007, p. 148). We chose the DJSI definition of a sustainable 
company that may in itself have proven too limitative.  
However, the fact remains that our data had to meet the assumptions underlying the statistics of 
multiple regression of the Modified Jones Model. As this was not the case, our research came to a 
standstill. We have not been able to test what we wanted to test, that is whether there is a difference in 
the extent to which sustainable and non-sustainable companies manage their earnings.  
Further research should take into account sample size. A broader definition of a sustainable company 
may result in a larger sample so that research may lead to detecting a difference in earnings 
management by sustainable and non-sustainable companies. 
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6. Summary and conclusion 
 
In this summary we go into the questions put in this thesis and their relationship to the results of our 
research. First, we defined earnings management. Literature on earnings management is quite 
extensive. For our research we used Healy‟s definition of earnings management, that is, earnings 
management “occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions 
in financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of 
the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers”.140 The 
fact that it includes, beside shareholders, other stakeholders, such as consumers and employees, joins 
in with the concept of a sustainable company as defined in this thesis that takes care of its stakeholders 
(chapter 3). 
Second, the motivations for earnings management were discussed. Although it is clear from literature on 
earnings management that the managing of earnings takes place, the extent to which it takes place 
often depends on what is at stake. Motivations for earnings management can be divided into categories: 
1) motivations to smooth earnings, 2) motivations to meet the expectations of the analysts or of the 
company‟s stakeholders, 3) motivations from contractual perspectives such as to maximize the bonus of 
the manager, and 4) motivations to reduce tax expenses. For instance, to smooth earnings, the first 
category, is to avoid fluctuations in the reported earnings. The shareholder may be happy with a 
constant dividend, such as is the case with the dividend of the ING Bank. However, if the bonus of a 
manager depends on the outcome of the reported earnings in a specific year, he or she may “select 
accounting procedures and accruals to maximize the value of his or her bonus awards” (Healy, 1985, p. 
106). Thus, reported earnings are often managed because of a certain motivation. 
In our research we assumed that there is less earnings management with sustainable companies as the 
impact of detection of earnings management with sustainable companies is greater than with non-
sustainable companies, leads to loss of reputation, and affects the company‟s bottom line (Vander 
Bauwhede, 2003). The impact is greater. Therefore, we wanted to investigate whether there is a 
difference in the extent of earnings management between sustainable and non-sustainable companies 
or not.  
Third, can earnings management be easily detected? As to the choice of accounting methods, earnings 
management is detected by analyzing the effects of the choice of the accounting rules. Other cases of 
earnings management can be detected by analyzing industry-specific regulation or the provision for tax 
assets. Thus, by analyzing the motivation for earnings management it is easier to detect it. This may 
imply that it is more difficult to detect cases of earnings management without any apparent motivation. 
If the motivation for earnings management is not that clear, the models to be used to detect earnings 
management in the above-mentioned cases are the total accrual-models, the specific accrual-based 
models, and the behaviour of results around a certain point. With the specific accrual-based model the 
researcher more or less knows with which accrual reported earnings have been manipulated, for 
instance the loss reserves in case of insurers. McNichols (2005) states that the specific accrual-based 
model is best used for industries in which earnings management is applied in a single or a small number 
of accruals (p. 335). This is consistent with Dechow et al. (2002) 141 who are convinced that 
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“management intent to manipulate” earnings “is unobservable, and likely idiosyncratic and sporadic. 
They suggest concentrating instead on “observable and recurring firm characteristics like volatility of 
operations, because higher volatility is associated with higher incidence of unavoidable estimation 
errors”. The specific accrual-based model was not feasible for our research as our population of 
sustainable companies consisted of only 65 companies in nine different industry sectors. Besides, 
Bissessur et al. (2005) come to the conclusion that it is best to determine earnings management by 
means of a mixture of the three above-mentioned models. Unfortunately, this model has not been 
developed yet.  
There are advantages and disadvantages to both the total accrual-based model and the specific 
accrual-based model. In case of the total accrual-based model, the researcher assumes that earnings 
management occurs in the test period and not in the estimation period, but this assumption may prove 
to be incorrect as the number of situations in which reported earnings can be managed are numerous. 
As our research is sector-neutral, we cannot use the specific accrual-based model. As the Modified 
Jones Model has the most power to detect earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995), we decided on 
this model for our research.  
Four, we had to define what a sustainable company is in order to be able to delineate a population of 
sustainable companies which can be compared to a population of non-sustainable companies as to 
earnings management. The concept of „corporate sustainability‟ as described by the DJSI is „a business 
approach that creates long-term shareholder value by embracing opportunities and managing risks 
deriving from economic, environmental and social developments‟ 142. We chose this definition to define 
a sustainable company for two reasons. The first reason is that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
define a sustainable company in a way similar to the research done by SAM Indexes GmbH (to 
compose a questionnaire, interviews with companies, have a close look at the company‟s publishings, 
etc.). The second reason is that the DJSI definition encompasses more, that is to say, a sustainable 
company creates long-term shareholder value by managing risks and grabbing opportunities due to 
social, economic and environmental developments without endangering the lives of future generations. 
The companies in the DJSI were thus delineated as our sample of sustainable companies. Besides, 
another criterion used by SAM Indexes GmbH to select sustainable companies is size, which in turn can 
be used to compose a sample of non-sustainable companies.  
While answering the first four questions of our research we had already encountered a number of 
hindrances that turned into limitations for our research. To begin with, the delineation of our sample of 
sustainable companies turned out to be a serious limitation. First, looking at the lists of the DJSI 
companies in the various years, we had to remove companies from the list, because they had been 
removed/added in the next/previous year. The number of more than 300 companies dwindled to a 
number of about 270. Second, when we ran queries in the CompuStat databases to find the data 
needed for the Modified Jones Model, many more companies disappeared from our list due to missing 
data, different book year, or the company having become inactive. Third, the data of more than 40 
sustainable companies were in the database CompuStat North America that gave even less data. The 
population of sustainable companies ultimately consisted of 65 sustainable companies. This was a 
serious setback for our research as it is difficult to generalise with a small sample. 
A second limitation we were faced with was the number of years we were able to investigate. Due to the 
introduction of the ISAE3000 in 2005, we could not include the years previous to 2005. As a time-series 
of 10 years (Jeter et al., 1999) is considered as the minimum for a research as the current research, we 
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focused on the quarterly data of 3 years. Besides, another limitation is the fact that the total accrual-
based model in order to “estimate firm-specific-parameter estimates requires a reasonable time series” 
143. As a reasonable time series requires at least 10 years of firm data, COMPUSTAT or other data 
sources may provide smaller samples of firms with sufficient data, which may lead to results that may 
not be representative (McNichols, 2000). Although we had 12 periods of firm data in our research in the 
test period, we eventually had only one period in the estimation period. This could have turned out to be 
a serious limitation in case we had been able to use the Modified Jones Model.  
A third limitation we came across, was the fact that the data of the sustainable companies had to be 
gathered from two different databases, that is the CompuStat Global and the CompuStat North America. 
This may lead to a difference in interpreting the various data. It turned out that the data of the 
companies in CompuStat North America mainly concerned financial companies. As the year 2008 had 
to be included due to the requirement of time-series, we were happy to exclude the financial institutions. 
The financial companies were hit hard by the financial crisis in 2008, which has had an enormous 
impact on the companies‟ earnings, and thus may have caused outliers in our research. Besides, 
Burgstahler et al. (1997) argue that „for financial institutions, incentives to avoid earnings decreases or 
losses may be linked to regulatory oversight. 144.  
A final limitation was the fact that the sample eventually consisted of only 65 companies that may have 
given rise to further doubt about the validity of our research. For a small sample of only 65 companies 
divided into 9 sectors and 10 countries, it would have been difficult to find striking statistical results. 
Although there are different guidelines for sample size, the outcomes may not generalize with other 
samples (Pallant, 2007, p. 148). So, in hindsight we have to state that the choice of the DJSI definition 
of a sustainable company may have been the wrong choice. We met various hindrances that turned out 
to be limitations for our research. Although the actual concept of a sustainable company used by SAM 
Indexes GmbH may have resulted in a number of limitations for our research, we do not think it led to 
the non-results of our research. Neither does it clarify the fact that the dependent and independent 
variables for both the sample of sustainable companies and non-sustainable companies did not show a 
normal distribution.  
The last two questions of our literature research dealt with the relationship between a sustainable 
company and its financial performance, and the discussion of the results of previous research on this 
relationship. The relationship between a sustainable company and its financial performance, or to put it 
more precisely the relationship between a company‟s CSR and its financial performance, has been 
examined by, among others, Pava and Kraus 1996, Waddock and Graves 1997, Verschoor, 1998, 
Roberts and Dowling 2002, and Nelling and Webb 2009. The results of their investigations are multiple: 
some researchers conclude the relationship is positive, whereas others indicate that the relationship is 
neutral or even negative. The mixed results may be due to the fact that the concept of CSR is defined in 
different ways. In further research the definition of CSR or of a sustainable company should be 
unequivocal. 
Hunton et al. (2006) demonstrate that „greater transparency in comprehensive income reporting reduces 
the likelihood that managers will engage in earnings management‟ 145. Research by Gelb et al. (2001) 
indicates that „enhanced disclosures …. increase demand for a firm‟s securities and ultimately lower its 
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cost of capital‟ 146, and that „firms disclose because it is the socially responsible thing to do‟ (p.1). 
However, greater transparency does not mean less earnings management.  
There should be universally accepted indicators for measuring CSR, and accounting rules or formats for 
corporate responsibility reporting. In “KPMG International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting” 
(2005) we find per country lists for mandatory reporting requirements, the main standards and 
guidelines on corporate management and reporting, and the main standards used for assurance on 
environment and sustainability reports. Globally, we have the International Standard for Assurance 
Engagements (ISAE), a standard for assurance on non-financial information, and AA1000 Assurance 
Standard (AA1000AS). We have to focus on standardization of a sustainability framework and 
assurance rules.  
This will eventually lead to a benchmark for sustainable companies, after which we will be able to 
compare sustainable companies with each other as to their CSR performance. Further research can 
concentrate on earnings management by companies from this benchmark and compare them with 
companies that do not belong to the benchmark. It will become feasible to compare sustainable 
companies with non-sustainable companies from a particular industry sector with each other and focus 
on firm-specific accruals, as in research for the insurance industry by Petroni (1992), and for banks by 
Graaf (2005).  
However, the fact remains that our data had to meet the assumptions underlying the statistics of 
multiple regression of the Modified Jones Model. We have not been able to test what we wanted to test, 
that is whether there is a difference in the extent to which sustainable and non-sustainable companies 
manage their earnings. Besides, although the testing in itself turned out to be very disappointing, we 
had not expected the calculated data to violate all rules of normality. As this normality is adamant when 
executing the regression of the modified Jones model, our research came to a standstill. 
Nevertheless, there were two possibilities left: 1) to transform the dependent variable mathematically 
using the formulae square root, logarithm, and inverse, and 2) execute non-parametric tests. The results 
of the various transformations of the dependent variable gave about 50% missing data. We then 
executed the non-parametric tests, that is the Mann-Whitney U Test and the Kruskal-Wallis Test, in 
order to find the cause of the non-linearity of the data.  We could not detect a significant difference in 
the amounts of total accruals, the dependent variable, of sustainable and non-sustainable companies. 
Further research was not possible as our data had to meet the assumptions underlying the statistics of 
multiple regression of the Modified Jones Model. 
From scientific literature it is clear that earnings management can be detected (Beidleman, 1973; 
Petroni, 1992; Dechow et al., 1995 Ohlson, 1995; Bissessur et al. 2005). Our research was meant to 
give results on earnings management for both sustainable and non-sustainable companies, but this was 
feasible. Although we realized from the start that earnings management may be hard to detect, we had 
not expected that our research would have come to a complete standstill. This is probably due to a 
number of reasons. First, the concept of a sustainable company as defined by the DJSI may have been 
too limitative. Second, the sample of DJSI companies eventually turned out to be quite small, which in 
turn probably led to non-results in our research. Third, although the Modified Jones Model has the most 
power to detect the difference in the extent of earnings management between sustainable and non-
                                               
146 Gelb, D.S., Strawser, J.A., 2001, „Corporate social responsibility and financial disclosure: an alternative explanation for 
increased disclosure, in: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 1-13.  
Do sustainable and non-sustainable companies differ in their extent of earnings management? 
 48 
sustainable companies (Dechow et al., 1995), it might not have been the correct model to detect 
earnings management with sustainable companies. 
However, the fact remains that both sustainable and non-sustainable companies failed the test of 
normality, which is probably due to our sample size. Therefore, we think that further research on this 
particular topic should deal with a larger sample size. But, before doing further research on earnings 
management with respect to sustainable companies, the definition of a sustainable company should be 
defined more precisely. This can, for instance, be achieved when we have a publicly recognized set of 
performance indicators, such as the GRI, independent verification, stakeholder engagement, the role of 
the government in enforcing a level playing field, and the importance of incentives.147 In this way, 
sustainability reports can be compared with each other.  
Another important point of particular interest with respect to our research is the accessibility of the 
database we used. It was more difficult to run queries in this database than we had expected. Besides, 
it turned out that this database consisted of two separate databases. This led to time-consuming queries 
and decision-making that we had not thought of when we set out. 
We can conclude that further research on this subject is needed, that before research is undertaken the 
following items are required: 1) a clearer concept of a sustainable company, 2) a larger sample of 
companies to be investigated, and 3) focus on a specific industry sector. In spite of the fact that we 
certainly did not investigate what we set out to, we hope that our thesis may contribute to understanding 
the problems underlying further research on detecting the difference in the extent of earnings 
management between sustainable and non-sustainable companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
147 KPMG‟s Sustainability Services and the United Nations Environment Programme, (2006), p.57. 
Do sustainable and non-sustainable companies differ in their extent of earnings management? 
 49 
7. Literature 
 
Adhirkari, A., Derashid, C., Zhang, H., (2005), „Earnings Management to influence tax policy‟, in: Journal 
of International Financial Management & Accounting, Vol. 16, Issue 2, pp. 142-163. 
Aljifri, K., (2007), „Measurement and motivations of earnings management: A critical perspective‟, in: 
Journal of Accounting – Business & Management, Vol. 14, pp. 75-95. 
Arya, A., Glover, J.C., Sunder, S., (2003), „Are unmanaged earnings always better for shareholders?, in: 
Accounting Horizons, Supplement, p. 114, pp. 111-116. 
Baarda B., de Goede, (2001), Basisboek Methoden en Technieken, Groningen, Wolters 
Ball, Ray, (2006), „International Financial Reportings Standards (IFRS): pros and cons for investors‟, in: 
Accounting and Business Research, International Accounting Policy Forum, pp. 5-27. 
Baron, D.P., (2001), „Private politics, corporate social responsibility, and integrated strategy‟, in: Journal 
of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 10, Issue 1, p. 7-45. 
Barton J., Simko P.J., (2002), „The balance sheet as an earnings management constraint‟, in: The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 77, supplement , pp. 1-27. 
Bauwhede, H. Vander, (2003), „Resultaatsturing en Kapitaalmarkten, Een Overzicht van de 
Academische Literatuur‟, in: Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie, mei, pp. 196-
204. 
Becchetti, L., Di Giacomo, S., Pinnacchio, D., (2005), „Corporate social responsibility and corporate 
performance: evidence from a panel of US listed companies‟, in: CEIS Tor Vergata, Research 
Paper Series, Vol. 26, No. 78, December, pp. 1-56.  
Beidleman, Carl R., (1973), „Income Smoothing: The Role of Management‟, in: The Accounting Review, 
October, Vol. XLVIII, no. 4, pp. 653-667. 
Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H., Welker, M., (2003), „The world price of earnings opactiy‟, in: The 
Accounting Accounting Review, Vol. 78, No. 3, pp. 641-678. 
Bissessur S., Langendijk H.P.A.J., (2005), „Earnings management: de stand van zaken ten aanzien van 
het onderzoeksontwerp‟, in: Financial Accounting, nummer 5 mei, pp. 4-13. 
Bowen, R.M., DuCharme, L., Shores, D., (1995), „Stakeholders‟ implicit claims and accounting method 
choice‟, in: Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 20, pp. 255-295. 
Burgstahler, D., en I. Dichev,  (1997), „Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses‟, 
in: Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.24, pp. 99-126. 
Bushman, R., J. Piotroski, and A. Smith, (2004), „What determines corporate transparency?‟, in: Journal 
of Accounting Research, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 207-52. 
Campbell, J.L., (2007), Why would corporations behave in socially responsible ways? An institutional 
theory of corporate social responsibility‟, in: Academy of Management Review, Vol. 32, No. 3,  
pp. 946-967. 
Cespa, G., Cestone, G., (2007), „Corporate social responsibility and managerial entrenchment‟, in: 
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 16, No. 3, p. 741-771. 
Do sustainable and non-sustainable companies differ in their extent of earnings management? 
 50 
CMIBRIEF, (2007), Corporate Social Responsibility of Multinational Corporations, January, Volume 6 
No.2. 
Coalition of Dutch CSOs & Trade Unions, (2003), MVO-platform, CSR Frame of Reference, July. 
Cochran, Philip L., Wood, Robert A., (1984), „Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial 
Performance‟, in: Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 42-56. 
Cornett, M. M., A. J. Marcus,.en H.Tehranian, (2008), „Corporate governance and pay-for-performance: 
The impact of earnings management‟, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 87 Issue 2, pp. 
357-373.  
Dechow, P. M., R.G. Sloan & A.P. Sweeney, (1995), „Detecting Earnings Management‟, in: The 
Accounting Review, April, Vol. 70 No. 2, pp. 193-225. 
Dechow, P.M., and Skinner, D.J., (2000), „Earnings management: Reconciling the views of accounting 
academics, practitioners, and regulators‟, in: Accounting Horizons, June, Vol. 14 No.2, pp. 235-
250. 
Dechow, P. M., Dichev I.D., (2002), „The quality of accruals and earnings: the role of accrual estimation 
errors‟, in: The Accounting Review, Supplement, Vol. 77, pp. 35-59.  
Dechow, P.M., Richardson, S.A., Tuna, I., (2003), „Why are earnings kinky? An examination of the 
earnings management explanation‟, in: Review of Accounting Studies, 8, pp. 355-384. 
Degeorge, F., J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser, (1999), „Earnings management to exceed thresholds‟, in: 
Journal of Business, Vol. 72, No. I, pp. 1-33. 
Devinney, T.M., (2009), „Is the socially responsible corporation a myth? The good, the bad, and the ugly 
of corporate social responsibility‟, in: Academy of Management Perspectives, May, pp. 44-53. 
Dr H. de Man, (2001), Methoden en Technieken van Bedrijfswetenschappelijk Onderzoek, OUNL, 
februari. 
Finch, N., (2005), „The motivations for adopting sustainability disclosure‟, in: MGSM working papers in 
management, MGSM WP 2005-17. 
Friedman, M., (1970), „The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits‟, in: New York Times 
Magazine. 
Gordon, M.J., (1964), „Postulates, principles and research in accounting‟, in: The Accounting Review, 
Vol. 65, pp.251-263. 
Goukasian, L., Whitney, L.K., (2007), „Do ethical and socially responsible firms under-perform? 
Evidence from financial and operating performances‟, Pepperdine University, Working Paper 
Series, draft March 14. 
Graaf, F.J. de, (2005), De bestuursstructuur en de maatschappelijke verantwoordelijkheid van 
ondernemingen. De invloed van stakeholders en de deregulering van de Nederlandse financiële 
sector, proefschrift, Eburon Delft. 
Graham, J., Harvey, C., Rajgopal, S., (2005), „The economic implications of corporate financial 
reporting‟, in: Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 40, (1-3), pp. 3-73. 
Gray, Rob, (2006), „Does sustainability reporting improve corporate behaviour?: Wrong question? Right 
time?‟, in: Accounting and Business Research, International Accounting Policy Forum, pp. 65-88. 
Do sustainable and non-sustainable companies differ in their extent of earnings management? 
 51 
Guay, W.R., Kothari, S.P., Watts, R.L., (1996), „A market-based evaluation of discretionary accrual 
models‟, in: Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.34, Supplement, pp. 83-105. 
Haigh, M., Jones, M.T., (2007), „A Critical Review of Relations between Corporate Responsibility 
Research and Practice‟, in: Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organizations Studies, Vol. 
12, No. 1, pp. 16-28. 
HB_Treasury, (november 2004), De Nederlandse corporate governance-code, principes en best-
practice-bepalingen, Supplement_2007. 
Healey, P. M. & J.M. Wahlen, (1999), „A review of the Earnings Management Literature and its 
Implication for Standard Setting‟, in: Accounting Horizons, December, pp. 365-383. 
Healy, P., (1985), „The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions‟, in: Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 7, pp. 85-107. 
Hillman, A. J., Keim, G. D., (2001), „Shareholder value, stakeholder management, and social issues: 
What‟s the bottom line?‟, in: Strategic Management Journal, Feb, Vol. 22, Iss.2, pp.125-137. 
Hirst, E.D., Hopkins, P.E., (1998), „Comprehensive Income Reporting and Analysts‟ Valuation 
Judgements‟, in: Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 36, Supplement, pp. 47-75. 
Hoeven, Dr. R.I. ter, (2000), „Onderzoek naar Jaarrekeningenbeleid en winstegalisatie; a continuing 
story‟, in: FSR Forum, nr 2 feb., pp. 23-28. 
Holthausen, R.W., Larcker, D.F., Sloan, R.G., (1995), „Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of 
earnings‟, in: Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19, pp. 29-74. 
Hoogendoorn, M. N., (2001), „Beleidsaspecten inzake de Jaarrekening‟, in: M.N. Hoogendoorn, J. 
Klaasen & F. Krens, Externe Verslaggeving in Theorie en Praktijk, Reed Business Information, 
Den Haag.  
Hoogendoorn, M.N., (2000), „Sturing van de winstcijfers: waarom en hoe?‟, in: FSR Forum, nr.2 feb., pp. 
18-22. 
Hribar, P., and D. Nichols, (2007), „The use of unsigned earnings quality measures in tests of earnings 
management‟, in: Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 44, No. 5, pp. 1017-53. 
Hunton, James E., Libby, Robert, Mazza, (2006), Cheri L., „Financial Reporting Transparency and 
Earnings Management‟, in: The Accounting Review, Vol. 81, No. 1, pp. 135-157. 
Iansen-Rogers, J., Oelschlaegel, J., (2005), Assurance Standards Briefing, AA1000Assurance Standard 
ξ ISAE3000, AccountAbility and KPMG. 
Jeter, D.C., Shivakumar, L., (1999), „Cross-sectional estimation of abnormal accrual using quarterly and 
annual data: effectiveness in detecting event-specific earnings management‟, in: Accounting and 
Business Research, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 299-319. 
Jones, J.J., (1991), „Earnings management during import relief investigations‟, in: Journal of Accounting 
Research, Vol. 29, No. 2 Autumn, pp 193-228. 
Jones, J.J., (1991), „Earnings management during import relief investigations‟, in: Journa l of Accounting 
Research, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 193-228. 
Kaptein, M., Wempe, J., (2002), The Balanced Company, A Theory of Corporate Integrity, Oxford 
University Press. 
Do sustainable and non-sustainable companies differ in their extent of earnings management? 
 52 
Kothari, S.P., Xu Li, Short, J.E., (2009), „The effect of disclosures by management, analysts, and 
business press on cost of capital, return volatility, and analyst forecasts: A study using content 
analysis‟, in: The Accounting Review, Vol. 84, No. 5, pp. 1639-1670. 
KPMG‟s Sustainability Services and the United Nations Environment Programme, (2006), Carrots and 
Sticks for Starters, Current trends and approaches in Voluntary and Mandatory Standards for 
Sustainability Reporting.  
Land, J. and Lang, M.H., (2002), „Empirical evidence on the evolution of international earnings, 
Supplement, Vol. 77, pp. 115-133. 
Langendijk, H.P.A.J., (1998), De kwaliteit van de winststuring, Een essay over winstbepaling, 
winststuring alsmede winstbestemming, Nyenrode University Press, Breukelen, oratie, pp. 1-53. 
Langendijk, H.P.A.J., (1998), „Resultaatsturing en Winstmanipulatie‟, in: Tijdschrift Financieel 
Management, juli/augustus, pp. 17-22. 
Langendijk, H.P.A.J. & B. van Praag, (2000), „Winstegalisatie: een Verslag van een Empirisch 
Onderzoek in Duitsland, Nederland en het V.K.‟, in: Tijdschrift voor Bedrijfsadministratie, 
januari/februari, pp. 42-52.  
Levitt, Arthur, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, (1998), The “Numbers Game”, 
Remarks at the New York University Center for Law and Business, 28 September 1998. 
Margolis, J.D., Walsh, J.P., (2003),  „Misery loves companies: rethinking social initiatives by business‟, 
in: Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 48, pp. 268-305. 
McGuire, J.B., Sundgren, A., Schneeweis, T., (1988), „Corporate social responsibility and firm financial 
performance‟, in: Academy of Mangement Journal, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 854-872. 
McNcNichols, M. F., (2005), „Research design issues in earnings management studies‟, in: Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 19, pp. 313-345. 
McWilliams, A. and Siegel, D., (2000), Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance: 
Correlation or Misspecification?, in: Strategic Management Journal, 21(5), pp. 603-609 
Mertens, G.M.H., (1997), The impact of changes in financial reporting regulation on financial accounting 
method choice, proefschrift Universiteit Maastricht, Noordhoff B.V.. 
MVO-platform, (2003), CSR Frame of Reference, July. 
Nelling, E., Webb, E., (2009), „Corporate social responsibility and financial performance: the “virtuous 
circle” revisited‟, in: Review of Quantative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 32, pp. 197-209. 
Owen, D., (2005), „CSR after Enron: a role for the academic accounting profession?‟, in: European 
Accounting Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 395-404. 
Phillips, J., Pincus, M., Rego, S., (2003), Earnings management: New evidence based on deferred tax 
expense, in: The Accounting Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 491-521. 
Praag, B. van, (2001), Earnings Management, Empirical Evidence on Value Relevance and Income 
Smoothing, Research Series, Universiteit van Amsterdam. 
Prior, D., Surroca, J., Tribó, J.A., (2008), „Are socially responsible managers really ethical? Exploring 
the relationship between earnings management and corporate social responsibility‟, in: Corporate 
Governance, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 160-177. 
Do sustainable and non-sustainable companies differ in their extent of earnings management? 
 53 
Roberts, P.W., Dowling, G.R., (2002), „Corporate reputation and sustained superior financial 
performance‟, in: Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 23, pp. 1077-1093. 
Rooijen, J. van, (2002), Flexibility in Financial Accounting, Income Strategies and Earnings 
Management in the Netherlands, Research Series, Universiteit van Amsterdam. 
Roychowdhury, S., (2006), „Earnings management through real activities manipulation‟, in: Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 42, pp. 335-370. 
Schipper, K. (1989), „Commentary on earnings management‟, in: Accounting Horizons, 3 (4), pp. 91-
102. 
Schnietz, K.E., Epstein, M.J., (2005), „Exploring the financial value of a reputation for corporate social 
responsibility during a crisis‟, in: Corporate Reputation Review, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 327-345. 
Schuler, D.A., Cording, M., (2006), „A corporate social performance – corporate financial performance 
behavioral model for consumers‟, in: Academy of Management Review, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 540-
558. 
Segers, Jo, (1999), Methoden voor Maatschappijwetenschappen, Van Gorcum. 
Simnett, R., Vanstraelen, A., Chua, W.F., (2009), „Assurance on Sustainability Reports: An International 
Comparison‟ in: The Accounting Review, May, 84, 3, pp. 937-967. 
Smith Bamber, L., Jiang, J., Petroni, K.R., Wang, I.Y., (2010), Comprehensive income: who‟s afraid of 
performance reporting?, in: The Accounting Review, Vol. 85, No. 1, pp. 97-126. 
Subramanyam, K.R.,  (1996), „The pricing of discretionary accruals‟, in: Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 22, pp. 249-281. 
Tucker, J.W., Zarowin, P.A., (2006), „Does income smoothing improve earnings informativeness?‟, in: 
The accounting review, Vol. 81, No. 1, pp. 251-270. 
Vander Bauwhede, H., (2003), „Resultaatsturing en Kapitaalmarkten, Een Overzicht van de 
Academische Literatuur‟, in: Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie, mei, pp. 196-
204.  
Verschoor, C.C., (1998), „A study of the link between a corporation‟s financial performance and its 
commitment to ethics‟, in: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 17, pp. 1509-1516. 
Verschuren P., Doorewaard H., (2001), Het ontwerpen van een onderzoek, Utrecht: Lemma B.V. 
Wood, D.J., (1991), „Corporate social performance revisited‟, in: Academy of Management Review, 
16(4), pp. 691-718. 
Xie, B., W.N. Davidson en P.J. Dalt, (2003), Earnings management and corporate governance: the roles 
of the board and the audit committee, in: Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 9, pp. 295-316. 
 
 
 
 
 
Do sustainable and non-sustainable companies differ in their extent of earnings management? 
 54 
7.1    Websites 
 
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/measerr.php 
http://www.leidenuniv.nl/fsw/psychologielexicon/index.php3-c=98.htm  
http://www.leidenuniv.nl/fsw/psychologielexicon/index.php3-c=98.htm 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketcapitalization.asp 
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/Downloads/     
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/Downloads/FTSE4Good_Inclusion_Criteria.pdf  
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/Downloads/FTSE4Good_Inclusion_Criteria.pdf 
http://www.sustainability-index.com/07_htmle/other/aboutus.html 
http://www.sustainability-index.com/07_htmle/assessment/overview.html 
www.sustainability-index.com 
http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Gauss+curve 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=972649. 
www.sustainability-index.com 
 
 
7.2    Newspaper articles 
Het Financieele Dagblad, Winststuring zal met IFRS niet verdwijen,  28-01-2005. (Pieter Couwenbergh) 
Het Financieele Dagblad, Verantwoord beleggen wordt de norm, 28-04-2005. 
Het Financieele Dagblad, Kritiek op IFRS zwaar overdreven, 21-04-2006. (Ruud Vergoossen) 
Het Financieele Dagblad, Voorbij schuld en reputatie, 29-04-2006. (Marleen Janssen Groesbeek). 
Het Financieele Dagblad, IFRS door regels bedreigd, 03-05-2006 (Bart Veldkamp). 
Het Financieele Dagblad, Belang maatschappelijk rendement neemt toe, 26-07-2006. 
Het Financieele Dagblad, Duurzame verslaglegging wordt volwassen, 06-10-2006. (Marleen Janssen 
Groesbeek) 
Het Financieele Dagblad, Duurzaamheidsverslag wettelijk verplichten, 06-10-2006. 
Het Financieele Dagblad, Duurzaam rapporteren, 09-10-2006. (Marleen Janssen Groesbeek) 
Het Financieele Dagblad, Regels GRI veel beter, 10-10-2006. (Rob van Tilburg en Lars Krznack) 
Het Financieele Dagblad, Mkb-pioniers roepen op tot duurzamere overheid, 25-01-2007. (Marleen 
Janssen Groesbeek) 
Het Financieele Dagblad, Aandeelhoudersmodel op de helling, 27-03-2007. (Marleen Janssen 
Groesbeek) 
Het Financieele Dagblad, Feike Sijbesma, 03-11-2007. (Marleen Janssen Groesbeek) 
 
 
 
 
 
Do sustainable and non-sustainable companies differ in their extent of earnings management? 
 55 
8. List of keywords 
 
AAERs accounting and auditing enforcement releases (in which SEC identifies 
extreme examples of earnings management) 
Accruals  the total of accounting items which causes a difference between the 
reported profit figures and the realized cash flow. Accruals can be 
divided into discretionary and non-discretionary ones 
CFP Corporate Financial Performance 
CSO Civil Society Organizations 
CSP Corporate Social Performance 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility = Maatschappelijk Verantwoord 
Ondernemen  =>Enterprising is more than making profits. Corporate 
governance can also contribute to a better society in which man and 
environment are just as important as earning money. (Source: Ministry 
of Economic Affairs) 
 CSR may be defined, consistent with McWilliams and Siegel (2001), as 
actions on the part of a firm that appear to advance the promotion of 
some social good beyond the immediate interests of the 
firm/shareholders and beyond legal requirements. 
CSR Corporate Sustainability Reporting, or triple-bottom-line reporting of 
economic, environmental and social performance 
Discretionary   left to one‟s own insight and decision 
Non-discretionary it is not left to the insight and decision of management but is dependent 
on other factors/actors 
Earnings management earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in   
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy and 
Wahlen) 
EPI Economic Performance Indicators 
FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board 
GRI Global Reporting Initiative 
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
MVO Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen 
NIDO Nationaal Initiatief Duurzame Ontwikkeling (Dutch National Initiative for 
Sustainable Development) was established in 1999 as an independent 
foundation and forms one of the initiatives taken by the cabinet as an 
investment in the Dutch knowledge infrastructure. 
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9. Appendices 
 
Appendix A. List of sustainable companies 
 
company name country sector 
ABB LTD Switserland Industrial 
ABERTIS INFRAESTRUCTURAS SA Spain Industrial 
ACCOR SA France Consumer discretionary 
ADIDAS AG Germany Consumer discretionary 
AKZO NOBEL NV Netherlands Materials 
ALCATEL-LUCENT France Information technology 
AMEC PLC Great Britain Energy 
ANGLO AMERICAN PLC Great Britain Materials 
ASML HOLDING NV Netherlands Information technology 
ASTRAZENECA PLC Great Britain Health Care 
BAYER AG Germany Health Care 
BG GROUP PLC Great Britain Energy 
BMW-BAYER MOTOREN WERKE AG Germany Consumer discretionary 
BP PLC Great Britain Energy 
BRITISH AMER TOB (MALAYSIA) Malaysia Consumer staples 
CARREFOUR SUPERMARCHE SA France Consumer staples 
CENTRICA PLC Great Britain Utilities 
CIA ENERGETICA DE MINAS Brazil Utilities 
CIE GEN DES ETABLIS MICHELIN France Consumer discretionary 
CRH PLC Ireland Industrial 
DAIMLER AG Germany Consumer discretionary 
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM Germany Telecommunication services 
ENDESA SA Spain Utilities 
ENEL SPA Italy Utilities 
FORTUM OYJ Finland Utilities 
GAS NATURAL FENOSA Spain Utilities 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC Great Britain Health Care 
HEINEKEN NV Netherlands Consumer staples 
HOLCIM LTD Switserland Materials 
IBERDROLA SA Spain Utilities 
ITV PLC Great Britain Consumer discretionary 
KESKO OYJ Finland Consumer staples 
KONINKLIJKE DSM NV Netherlands Materials 
LADBROKES Great Britain Consumer discretionary 
METRO AG Germany Consumer staples 
NATIONAL EXPRESS GROUP PLC Great Britain Industrial 
NOKIA (AB) OY Finland Information technology 
NORSK HYDRO ASA Norway Materials 
NOVARTIS AG Switserland Health Care 
NOVOZYMES A/S Denmark Materials 
PEARSON PLC Great Britain Consumer discretionary 
PHILIPS ELECTRONICS (KON) NV Netherlands Industrial 
RANDSTAD HOLDINGS NV Netherlands Industrial 
ROCHE HOLDING AG Switserland Health Care 
ROLLS-ROYCE GROUP PLC Great Britain Industrial 
RWE AG Germany Utilities 
Do sustainable and non-sustainable companies differ in their extent of earnings management? 
 57 
SAP AG Germany Information technology 
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC SA France Industrial 
SIAM CEMENT PCL Thailand Materials 
SKF AB Sweden Industrial 
SMITH & NEPHEW PLC Great Britain Health Care 
STATOIL ASA Norway Energy 
STMICROELECTRONICS NV Netherlands Information technology 
SWISSCOM AG Switserland Telecommunication services 
TECHNIP COFLEXIP SA France Energy 
TELECOM ITALIA SPA - NEW Italy Telecommunication services 
TELEFONICA SA Spain Telecommunication services 
TELENOR ASA Norway Telecommunication services 
TELEVISION FRANCAISE 1 France Consumer discretionary 
TNT NV Netherlands Industrial 
TOTAL France Energy 
TRAVIS PERKINS PLC Great Britain Industrial 
UNILEVER NV Netherlands Consumer staples 
UNILEVER PLC Great Britain Consumer staples 
VOLVO AB Sweden Industrial 
 
 
 
Appendix B. List of non-sustainable companies 
 
company name country sector 
A2A SPA Italy Utilities 
ACCIONA SA Spain Utilities 
ADECCO SA Switserland Industrial 
ADVANCED INFO SERVICE PCL Thailand Telecommunication services 
AKER SOLUTIONS ASA Norway Energy 
ASSA ABLOY AB Sweden Industrial 
ATLANTIA SPA Italy Industrial 
BEIERSDORF AG Germany Consumer staples 
BOLIDEN AB Sweden Materials 
BUZZI UNICEM SPA Italy Materials 
CAP GEMINI SA France Information technology 
CARLSBERG A/S Denmark Consumer staples 
CELESIO AG Germany Health Care 
CERMAQ ASA Norway Consumer staples 
CGG VERITAS France Energy 
COLAS SA France Industrial 
CONTINENTAL AG Germany Consumer discretionary 
DEUTSCHE POST AG Germany Industrial 
EASYJET PLC Great Britain Industrial 
EDF France Utilities 
ELISA CORP Finland Telecommunication services 
ENBW ENERGIE BADEN Germany Utilities 
ENTERPRISE INNS PLC Great Britain Consumer discretionary 
ERICSSON (LM) TELEFON Sweden Information technology 
ESSILOR INTERNATIONAL SA France Health Care 
ESSO SAF France Energy 
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FOMENTO DE CONSTRUC Y CONTRA Spain Industrial 
GDF SUEZ France Utilities 
H LUNDBECK A/S Denmark Health Care 
HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG Germany Materials 
HERMES INTERNATIONAL France Consumer discretionary 
IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP PLC Great Britain Consumer staples 
INCHCAPE PLC Great Britain Consumer discretionary 
INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG Germany Information technology 
INTERNATIONAL POWER PLC Great Britain Utilities 
KONINKLIJKE AHOLD NV Netherlands Consumer staples 
KONINKLIJKE KPN NV Netherlands Telecommunication services 
LINDE AG Germany Materials 
LOGICA PLC Great Britain Information technology 
L'OREAL SA France Consumer staples 
LVMH MOET HENNESSY L VUITTON France Consumer discretionary 
MARINE HARVEST ASA Norway Consumer staples 
NOBEL BIOCARE HOLDING AG Switserland Health Care 
NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER A/S Norway Materials 
PETROFAC LTD Great Britain Energy 
PEUGEOT SA France Consumer discretionary 
PTT CHEMICAL PCL Thailand Materials 
PUBLICIS GROUPE SA France Consumer discretionary 
RYANAIR HOLDINGS PLC Ireland Industrial 
SAINT-GOBAIN (CIE DE) France Industrial 
SCA-SVENSKA CELLULOSA AB Sweden Materials 
SCOTTISH & SOUTHERN ENERGY Great Britain Utilities 
SECURITAS AB Sweden Industrial 
SHIRE LTD Great Britain Health Care 
SYNTHES INC WILMINGTON Switserland Health Care 
TDC A/S Denmark Telecommunication services 
TELEKOM MALAYSIA BHD Malaysia Telecommunication services 
TERNA SPA Italy Utilities 
TIETO CORP Finland Information technology 
TULLOW OIL PLC Great Britain Energy 
UPM-KYMMENE CORP Finland Materials 
VINCI France Industrial 
VOLKSWAGEN AG Germany Consumer discretionary 
WOOD GROUP (JOHN) PLC Great Britain Energy 
WPP PLC Great Britain Consumer discretionary 
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Appendix D 
 
Tests of Normality on sustainable companies 
  Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
TAq405 ,404 65 ,000 ,227 65 ,000 
TAq106 ,432 65 ,000 ,199 65 ,000 
TAq206 ,183 65 ,000 ,885 65 ,000 
TAq306 ,267 65 ,000 ,500 65 ,000 
TAq406 ,256 65 ,000 ,742 65 ,000 
TAq107 ,116 65 ,031 ,951 65 ,012 
TAq207 ,177 65 ,000 ,920 65 ,000 
TAq307 ,212 65 ,000 ,839 65 ,000 
TAq407 ,133 65 ,006 ,884 65 ,000 
TAq108 ,151 65 ,001 ,892 65 ,000 
TAq208 ,291 65 ,000 ,624 65 ,000 
TAq308 ,173 65 ,000 ,861 65 ,000 
TAq408 ,106 65 ,067 ,967 65 ,077 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction       
 
 
 
 
Tests of Normality on non-sustainable companies 
  Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
  Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
TAq405 ,138 65 ,004 ,927 65 ,001 
TAq106 ,130 65 ,008 ,947 65 ,008 
TAq206 ,129 65 ,009 ,956 65 ,022 
TAq306 ,115 65 ,033 ,927 65 ,001 
TAq406 ,207 65 ,000 ,715 65 ,000 
TAq107 ,136 65 ,004 ,935 65 ,002 
TAq207 ,154 65 ,001 ,865 65 ,000 
TAq307 ,134 65 ,005 ,843 65 ,000 
TAq407 ,212 65 ,000 ,731 65 ,000 
TAq108 ,199 65 ,000 ,760 65 ,000 
TAq208 ,196 65 ,000 ,718 65 ,000 
TAq308 ,178 65 ,000 ,777 65 ,000 
TAq408 ,097 65 ,200* ,967 65 ,081 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction       
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Appendix D. Mann-Whitney Test for both sustainable and non-sustainable companies 
 
TAq405 = Total accruals by lagged total assets of quarter 4 of 2005  
1  = sustainable companies    
2 = non-sustainable companies    
Ranks 
    N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
TAq405 1 65 61,96 4027,50 
2 65 69,04 4487,50 
Total 130     
TAq106 1 65 63,62 4135,00 
2 65 67,38 4380,00 
Total 130     
TAq206 1 65 69,48 4516,00 
2 65 61,52 3999,00 
Total 130     
TAq306 1 65 67,03 4357,00 
2 65 63,97 4158,00 
Total 130     
TAq406 1 65 65,32 4246,00 
2 65 65,68 4269,00 
Total 130     
TAq107 1 65 62,68 4074,00 
2 65 68,32 4441,00 
Total 130     
TAq207 1 65 68,66 4463,00 
2 65 62,34 4052,00 
Total 130     
TAq307 1 65 62,35 4053,00 
2 65 68,65 4462,00 
Total 130     
TAq407 1 65 64,54 4195,00 
2 65 66,46 4320,00 
Total 130     
TAq108 1 65 67,25 4371,00 
2 65 63,75 4144,00 
Total 130     
TAq208 1 65 65,52 4259,00 
2 65 65,48 4256,00 
Total 130     
TAq308 1 65 66,35 4313,00 
2 65 64,65 4202,00 
Total 130     
TAq408 1 65 67,31 4375,00 
2 65 63,69 4140,00 
Total 130     
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Mann-Whitney U Test              
               
category company TAq405 TAq106 TAq206 TAq306 TAq406 TAq107 TAq207 TAq307 TAq407 TAq108 TAq208 TAq308 TAq408 
1 N 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
 Median -,0120842 -,0022740 -,0083554 -,0143325 -,0107256 -,0031888 -,0054022 -,0175610 -,0113989 -,0012811 -,0042840 -,0120671 -,0114998 
2 N 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
 Median -,0080740 -,0017606 -,0077636 -,0147860 -,0114145 -,0016273 -,0075673 -,0115156 -,0082936 -,0013625 -,0050961 -,0123135 -,0161351 
Mann-Whitney 
U 
 1882,500 1990,000 1854,000 2013,000 2101,000 1929,000 1907,000 1908,000 2050,000 1999,000 2111,000 2057,000 1995,000 
Z  -1,071 -,570 -1,204 -,463 -,054 -,854 -,957 -,952 -,291 -,528 -,007 -,258 -,547 
Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) ,284 ,568 ,229 ,643 ,957 ,393 ,339 ,341 ,771 ,597 ,994 ,796 ,584 
r = z/square of 
N 
 -,0000634 -,0000338 -,0000712 -,0000274 -,0000032 -,0000506 -,0000566 -,0000563 -,0000172 -,0000313 -,0000004 -,0000153 -,0000324 
1 = sustainable 
company 
             
2= non-sustainable company             
 
 
For instance for Taq206 (quarter 2 of 2006) the Z value is –1.20 with a significance level of p = .23. The probability value (p) is not less than or equal to .05, so the result is not 
significant, which means that there is no statistically significant difference between the score for total accruals lagged by total assets of sustainable and non-sustainable 
companies. 
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Mann-Whitney U Test 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
TAq405 130 -,0026005 ,16228721 -,21898 1,77458 
TAq106 130 ,0156878 ,20724604 -,12231 2,30871 
TAq206 130 -,0053487 ,02174681 -,06083 ,07815 
TAq306 130 -,0132383 ,04794267 -,25288 ,36143 
TAq406 130 -,0160530 ,04952539 -,29082 ,09678 
TAq107 130 -,0010148 ,03827624 -,11386 ,13813 
TAq207 130 -,0050711 ,02856202 -,14988 ,08961 
TAq307 130 -,0157790 ,03709270 -,19835 ,16290 
TAq407 130 -,0111120 ,04277920 -,21365 ,21979 
TAq108 130 ,0004026 ,04524013 -,14335 ,26009 
TAq208 130 -,0025090 ,04053021 -,14505 ,27161 
TAq308 130 -,0173691 ,03986667 -,24013 ,08609 
TAq408 130 -,0173387 ,03129505 -,12139 ,07648 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do sustainable and non-sustainable companies differ in their extent of earnings management? 
 65 
 
Appendix 
D. 
                         
Kruskal-Wallis test on sustainable companies 
divided by sector 
                   
                           
sector N TAq405 N TAq10
6 
N TAq206 N TAq306 N TAq406 N TAq10
7 
N TAq207 N TAq307 N TAq407  TAq10
8 
 TAq208  TAq308  TAq408 
10 6 32,33 6 26,50 6 27,83 6 23,33 6 48,17 6 18,67 6 39,00 6 30,00 6 30,83 6 28,17 6 42,33 6 24,50 6 38,33 
15 8 28,63 8 32,88 8 36,25 8 24,75 8 34,38 8 8,00 8 39,63 8 27,00 8 30,63 8 37,00 8 30,63 8 39,63 8 15,00 
20 11 37,73 11 30,55 11 39,82 11 39,45 11 31,45 11 11,00 11 40,91 11 37,73 11 34,91 11 36,55 11 40,18 11 35,45 11 35,36 
25 9 39,22 9 44,33 9 27,78 9 34,78 9 30,44 9 9,00 9 18,67 9 35,78 9 34,33 9 40,67 9 25,78 9 46,56 9 36,44 
30 7 33,43 7 47,71 7 28,29 7 30,29 7 25,00 7 7,00 7 36,29 7 36,86 7 19,43 7 40,29 7 39,29 7 28,43 7 24,43 
35 6 34,00 6 36,00 6 44,67 6 42,67 6 35,83 6 6,00 6 47,50 6 26,50 6 42,17 6 26,83 6 42,17 6 28,33 6 40,33 
45 5 22,20 5 26,40 5 30,00 5 42,20 5 32,80 5 5,00 5 27,40 5 37,20 5 35,40 5 18,20 5 33,40 5 32,40 5 49,00 
50 5 30,20 5 14,20 5 19,80 5 17,20 5 27,00 5 5,00 5 18,80 5 17,80 5 16,40 5 22,00 5 11,20 5 16,20 5 33,40 
55 8 31,75 8 29,38 8 35,63 8 36,88 8 34,00 8 8,00 8 25,75 8 40,00 8 46,75 8 33,50 8 27,63 8 32,50 8 31,63 
Total 65  65  65  65  65  65  65  65  65  65  65  65  65  
                           
Kruskal-Wallis test on non-sustainable 
companies divided by sector 
                   
                           
sector N TAq405 N TAq10
6 
N TAq206 N TAq306 N TAq406 N TAq10
7 
N TAq207 N TAq307 N TAq407  TAq10
8 
 TAq208  TAq308  TAq408 
10 6 24,50 6 33,33 6 36,50 6 29,33 6 22,33 6 37,67 6 29,33 6 29,17 6 26,33 6 40,50 6 27,17 6 31,50 6 39,00 
15 8 30,25 8 27,25 8 34,25 8 36,50 8 38,25 8 20,63 8 42,88 8 32,88 8 39,38 8 22,50 8 47,88 8 34,38 8 29,25 
20 11 32,45 11 30,27 11 37,45 11 40,18 11 35,27 11 34,36 11 39,36 11 33,82 11 29,91 11 36,64 11 39,45 11 30,91 11 29,82 
25 9 39,00 9 40,22 9 31,11 9 38,44 9 39,56 9 41,11 9 36,78 9 30,67 9 43,78 9 41,22 9 32,44 9 36,56 9 39,78 
30 7 42,86 7 32,43 7 29,57 7 34,00 7 34,00 7 34,71 7 30,71 7 34,14 7 28,00 7 33,29 7 24,71 7 36,14 7 29,29 
35 6 35,17 6 46,17 6 29,50 6 30,50 6 24,67 6 49,83 6 19,00 6 37,67 6 38,50 6 35,50 6 30,67 6 31,83 6 44,67 
45 5 31,00 5 34,80 5 42,60 5 22,20 5 33,80 5 22,80 5 39,20 5 34,00 5 19,60 5 38,00 5 23,00 5 22,20 5 22,00 
50 5 25,20 5 17,20 5 21,80 5 20,60 5 16,40 5 16,00 5 22,40 5 11,40 5 21,80 5 16,20 5 31,40 5 18,20 5 19,00 
55 8 32,00 8 33,50 8 31,75 8 31,75 8 40,50 8 33,75 8 28,13 8 45,88 8 39,38 8 28,88 8 30,50 8 45,75 8 39,13 
Total 65  65  65  65  65  65  65  65  65  65  65  65  65  
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Appendix D. Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Sustainable companies 
 
 
Non-sustainable companies 
 
 
 
 
TAq405 TAq106 TAq206 TAq306 TAq406 TAq107 TAq207 TAq307 TAq407 TAq108 TAq208 TAq308 TAq408
Chi-Square 3,896 14,366 8,238 11,177 6,055 13,383 16,859 7,414 13,544 9,056 13,968 11,739 14,165
df 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Asymp. Sig. ,866 ,073 ,411 ,192 ,641 ,099 ,032 ,493 ,094 ,338 ,083 ,163 ,078
a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: sector
Test Statistics
a,b
TAq405 TAq106 TAq206 TAq306 TAq406 TAq107 TAq207 TAq307 TAq407 TAq108 TAq208 TAq308 TAq408
Chi-Square 5,208 8,742 4,455 6,774 10,074 15,829 10,046 11,044 11,046 10,304 9,822 9,082 10,214
df 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Asymp. Sig. ,735 ,365 ,814 ,561 ,260 ,045 ,262 ,199 ,199 ,244 ,278 ,335 ,250
a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: sector
Test Statistics
a,b
N Mean
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
TAq405 65 ,0129974 ,22613302 -,21898 1,77458
TAq106 65 ,0344409 ,28954535 -,11714 2,30871
TAq206 65 -,0070019 ,02064412 -,05170 ,07815
TAq306 65 -,0116453 ,05912119 -,25288 ,36143
TAq406 65 -,0184969 ,04950891 -,22727 ,07490
TAq107 65 ,0017489 ,04083744 -,11386 ,13813
TAq207 65 -,0068651 ,02636822 -,07680 ,07733
TAq307 65 -,0109943 ,03928760 -,11527 ,16290
TAq407 65 -,0126830 ,03592249 -,17104 ,09135
TAq108 65 -,0032652 ,04201729 -,14335 ,16164
TAq208 65 ,0010589 ,04669358 -,10023 ,27161
TAq308 65 -,0174126 ,03719208 -,16483 ,08609
TAq408 65 -,0190004 ,03081182 -,10131 ,07648
Descriptive Statistics
N Mean
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
TAq405 65 -,0181984 ,03815048 -,13867 ,11903
TAq106 65 -,0030653 ,04496774 -,12231 ,13275
TAq206 65 -,0036955 ,02283650 -,06083 ,06699
TAq306 65 -,0148314 ,03365178 -,15199 ,05329
TAq406 65 -,0136091 ,04980551 -,29082 ,09678
TAq107 65 -,0037785 ,03563456 -,08450 ,11132
TAq207 65 -,0032771 ,03070024 -,14988 ,08961
TAq307 65 -,0205638 ,03439790 -,19835 ,04222
TAq407 65 -,0095409 ,04892111 -,21365 ,21979
TAq108 65 ,0040704 ,04829637 -,11422 ,26009
TAq208 65 -,0060769 ,03324026 -,14505 ,15340
TAq308 65 -,0173256 ,04266477 -,24013 ,06521
TAq408 65 -,0156770 ,03192312 -,12139 ,06634
Descriptive Statistics
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Appendix E. Sustainable companies normality tests 
 
Normal Q-Q Plot of Total Accruals lagged by total assets per quarter 
 
In neither of the Normal Q-Q Plots below of both sustainable and non-sustainable companies, do we find a reasonably 
straight line which would suggest a normal distribution. In the Detrended Normal Q-Q Plots of quarter 4 of 2005 up to quarter 
4 of 2008we find the actual deviation of the scores from the straight line plotted. However,  we find clustering around the zero 
line.  
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Non-sustainable companies. Normality tests.  
 
Normal Q-Q Plot of Total Accruals lagged by total assets per quarter 
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